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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis covers an extended overview about interest rate risk (IRR) in general and
two essays on theoretical and empirical financial intermediation covering the pricing and
risk management of banks’ IRR exposure. It investigates how banks should optimally
price the IRR stemming from maturity transformation into loan and deposit rates and
whether such optimal behavior can be found in bank interest margins. Moreover, it
addresses the question of how IRR hedging off the balance sheet affects their maturity
transformation. This chapter gives an extended overview of the literature dealing with
financial intermediaries’ IRR management and briefly introduces the following chapters.
The main task of financial intermediaries — such as commercial banks — is the trans-
formation of risks between lenders and borrowers of funds. When accepting deposits and
handing out loans financial intermediaries take on credit risk as some borrowers might not
succeed with their projects and therefore fail to repay their loans. Additionally, banks are
exposed to liquidity and maturity risk by transforming deposits — that can be withdrawn
anytime — into long-term loans. Liquidity and interest rate risk are closely related. The
main difference between maturity and liquidity risk is the repricing frequency of assets
and liabilities (e.g., Brunnermeier and Yogo, 2009). Together with the transformation
of investment size, as a single borrowers’ loan is usually funded with the deposits from
several saving accounts, these tasks are known as qualitative asset transformation (e.g.,
Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Freixas and Rochet, 2008).
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As financial intermediaries’ core business is inherently associated with risk taking, risk
management is an essential task. The most obvious way of risk management is an adequate
measurement of the risks undertaken and their interconnection. Knowing the risks, banks
can price them into loan and deposit rates so that they earn a risk premium over the risk-
free rate, which compensates them for expected losses and pays shareholders a return on
equity. Credit risk can be reduced by diversification (Diamond, 1984), but liquidity risk
and IRR cannot be fully diversified away, but only allocated between parties. Nowadays,
securitization allows banks to lay off all risks associated with assets to the capital markets,
and off-balance sheet (OBS) transactions enable banks to trade risks with counterparties.
Derivatives easily permit banks to hedge the non-diversifiable interest rate and currency
risk via forwards, futures, and swaps. Credit risk is now increasingly managed using credit
default swaps (CDS) and related products.
IRR measures the extent to which a bank is affected by changes in market interest rates.
There are two ways in which IRR can have an impact on banks. The first is the valuation
risk that assets, liabilities and OBS positions change their market values with an unfavor-
able impact on the bank’s economic value — often expressed as the market value of equity.
Alternatively, a cash flow risk perspective can be taken, which is consistent with the value
perspective as the sum of discounted cash flows should equal the economic value (English,
2002). Most often, interest income and expenses are then examined. Valuation risk is
more closely related to the balance sheet, whereas the effects of cash flow risk become
more visible in the profit and loss (P&L) statements. In general, with a positive duration
gap — when the maturity of assets exceeds the maturity of liabilities — an increase in
market rates leads to a deterioration in the market value of equity as market value in
assets declines more heavily compared to liabilities. Furthermore, as liabilities mature
more frequently or have to be repriced, interest expenses rise more heavily compared to
income and profitability decreases. This risk from a cash flow perspective is also referred
to as the refinancing risk, or because of its close alignment with liquidity risk, as roll-over
risk if liabilities — such as wholesale funding — cannot be refinanced at all.
IRR can have different sources. Among them are repricing risk, yield curve risk, and
basis risk. Repricing risk exists when assets and liabilities have different sensitivities to
2
changes in market rates due to different maturities, repricing frequencies, base rates for
floating-rate positions, discretion for positions where the bank is allowed to adjust rates
at will, and bank customers’ implicit options to repay loans and withdraw deposits in
response to the interest rate environment. Yield curve risk refers to the risk that the yield
curve does not change all relevant market rates to the same extent but the shape of the
yield curve has a different impact on assets and liabilities, even though they might have
the same sensitivities to IRR. Finally, basis risk evolves when floating-rate instruments
are adjusted to differing market rates, known as base rates (English, 2002).
Although banks’ IRR exposure received most attention during the S&L crisis ranging from
the 1980s until the mid-1990s in the U.S., the global financial crisis, that started with the
U.S. subprime crisis, has put much attention to banks’ liquidity risk, especially the roll-
over risk caused by wholesale funding (e.g., Acharya and Merrouche, 2013). However, with
the beginning of the current decade banking supervisors have again shifted their focus
on banks IRR exposure. Donald L. Kohn, a vice chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System announced his concerns in a speech at the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in January 2010 (see, Kohn, 2010). Although central banks are
willing to supply liquidity at extraordinary low rates for the next years, they will have
to raise rates when their economies have recovered at some point of time. Researchers
at the International Monetary Fund share this belief and regard higher levels of short-
term rates as a macroprudential mechanism of financial stability (Blanchard et al., 2010).
However, raising rates would serve as an interest rate shock and would hit banks with a
positive maturity mismatch (Kohn, 2010). A change in central bank policy could then
have similar effects as at the beginning of the S&L crisis when a policy of monetary
tightening increased short-term rates in the U.S.
Similarly, the Deutsche Bundesbank announced in their 2010 Financial Stability Re-
port concerns of banks increasing their maturity gaps drastically in the aftermath of
the Lehman crisis (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010). As savers searched for safe havens, the
smaller savings and cooperative banks, in particular, experienced enormous inflows of
short-term savings deposits that enforced these banks’ maturity gaps. The drop in short-
term rates, while the long-term rates remained comparatively stable, steepened the slope
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of the yield curve and gave banks incentives to keep the resulting IRR in their banking
books. At the same time the BaFin announced to put more scrutiny on banks with high
IRR and to consider requiring additional capital from these banks (see, Osman et al.,
2010). Finally, in November 2011 the Bundesbank tightened the regulation for German
commercial banks’ IRR in the banking book. The interest rate shock banks have to sim-
ulate was increased from 130 basis points to 200 basis points while the maximum loss of
regulatory capital remained constant (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012). To summarize the
recent developments, although IRR is not present in discussions as much as liquidity risk
is, it still plays an important role in the overall risk financial intermediaries take, and is
still a central issue in banking regulation.
Chapter 2 provides a literature overview on banks’ IRR and describes how the two essays
contribute to the literature. Chapter 3 presents the essay on how banks price the risk
and expected returns arising from maturity transformation into their interest income and
expenses. Chapter 4 investigates how the simultaneous use of interest rate swaps affects
banks’ duration gap.
4
Chapter 2
Literature on Interest Rate Risk and
Hedging
IRR is a major source of market risk in commercial banking and therefore regulators
demand prudent supervision. In contrast to credit risk, no extra capital generally has to
be set aside for IRR. Nevertheless, the national regulators can enforce an increase in reg-
ulatory capital for banks with excessive IRR (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2004). The dangers of excessive interest rate risk taking with the potential to destabilize
a whole financial system became apparent with the onset of the savings and loan (S&L),
or thrift, crisis of the 1980s to mid-1990s in the U.S.1 The crisis started with short-term
rates and rate volatility soaring in the early 1980s. Most savings banks had granted long-
term fixed-rate loans and were funded with demandable deposits. Deposit rate ceilings
did not allow savings and loan associations to adjust their rates to market rates. By the
mid-1980s most of these banks were de facto insolvent, but nevertheless were allowed to
keep operating (Barth, 1991). Today, they would be referred to as zombie banks. Expan-
sion of deposit insurance and the deregulation of the industry only relaxed the income
situation of the S&Ls in the short term, but provided several incentives for moral hazard
that finally resulted in the crisis (Kroszner and Strahan, 1996). Several savings and loan
associations failed and depositors would have suffered severe losses (James, 1991) if the
1 See, Gupta and Misra (1999) for a survey on the S&L crisis.
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government had not paid the cost of up to $150 billion with taxpayers’ money (Gupta
and Misra, 1999).
With the beginning of the thrift debacle, the sensitivity of bank lending to shocks in
the monetary policy rate attracted attention. The outflow of deposits during times of
rising prime rates, such as the Federal funds rate in the U.S., forces banks to reduce
their granting of new loans. In the literature, this is known as the bank lending channel
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1992) and generally focuses on changes in aggregate lending.
Hitherto, the literature has chiefly emphasized the importance of size (Kashyap and Stein,
1995), capital (Kishan and Opiela, 2000), liquid assets (Kashyap and Stein, 2000), and
internal capital markets within conglomerate banking firms (Campello, 2002) in mitigating
the impact of monetary shocks. However, a small group of papers directly addresses the
influence of the maturity mismatch on lending volume.
These studies have their roots in the theoretical model provided by van den Heuvel (2002).
The author provides the link from income and losses and capital accumulation to banks’
lending behavior. Empirically, the impact of maturity transformation within the bank
lending channel has been tested by Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), who prove that
banks with a higher exposure to IRR decrease lending more drastically. These authors
are the first to use a very detailed measure of the maturity gap, apart from the one-
year repricing gap which has commonly been employed as a proxy (e.g., Flannery and
James, 1984). When focusing on the price-setting behavior of banks, Gambacorta (2008)
reports that banks with a larger maturity mismatch increase loan and deposit rates more
drastically. The increase in loan rates dominates the increase in deposits in order to
compensate banks for declining profitability when a higher volume of deposits reprices
compared to loans. Recently, Landier et al. (2012) confirm that banks with a higher
sensitivity to IRR cut back lending more drastically when affected by a hike in short-
term rates. However, the banks hit are also the ones that increased their duration gap
drastically in the four years before the monetary tightening. Black and Rosen (2011) show
that banks not only decrease their new lending but also change its composition. During
periods of monetary tightening, banks tend to hand out new loans with significantly
shorter maturity than before, thereby reducing their on-balance exposure to IRR via a
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reduction of the duration gap. Again, this effect is stronger for banks that initially had a
larger maturity mismatch. In Germany, savings and cooperative banks use their interbank
lending structures with their affiliated head institutions, for example, the Landesbanken
for savings banks, as internal capital markets comparable to bank holding company (BHC)
structures in order to manage their on-balance-sheet exposure to IRR (Ehrmann and
Worms, 2004).
Another link between the level of the monetary policy and bank lending has been put
forward in the risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu, 2012). Low levels of interest rates
lead to a “search-for-yield” into riskier investments (Rajan, 2006). In the years before the
onset of the financial crisis, banks have systematically lowered their lending standards in
response to the monetary policy rate (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011) and accepted less
credit-worthy borrowers. This credit-risk-seeking behavior is induced by the transmission
of the monetary policy rate to short-term yields and not to long-term yields (Jiménez
et al., 2012).
Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Stein (2012) show that an excessive supply of liquidity by
central banks can lead to maturity transformation of systemic risk exposure. The regulator
can either limit such behavior by introducing reserve requirements or is committed to
bailing out the banks for too-many-to-fail reasons. Hence, the risk-taking channel works
not only through enhanced credit risk but also through maturity transformation as a
byproduct of liquidity creation. Furthermore, a reversion of central banks’ current low
interest rate policy can serve as an interest rate shock with the consequences described
above.
In summary, although the financial crisis that started with the U.S. mortgage crisis drew
much of regulators’ attention to liquidity risk and leverage, IRR is still an important issue
in banking supervision. Below, I will briefly introduce each chapter and describe how the
results contribute to the literature.
Pricing of interest rate risk
Banks will charge a risk premium for the maturity mismatch they are willing to accept in
order to supply liquidity. The theoretical literature on the determinants of banks’ interest
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margin, i.e. the difference between the rate charged on a single type loan less the rate paid
on a prototype deposit, can be separated into two strands. The first is the “dealership
approach” that has its roots in the pricing decisions of security dealers optimizing their
bid/ask spread (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981). The second strand are the “cost-of-good-
sold” models. Their foundation lies in the banking firm literature that regards deposits
as an input to produce loan output (e.g., Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972; Sealey, 1980). The
second strand treats the cost of funding, i.e. deposit rates; as stochastic, whereas the
dealership models consider deposit rates an endogenous variable that banks maximize
simultaneously with loan rates.
The dealership model in banking emerged with the seminal study of Ho and Saunders
(1981), and therefore all related models are also referred to as Ho-Saunders type models.
Ho and Saunders (1981) derive a model which explains a bank’s pricing decisions when
the bank is faced with endogenous demand for loans and supply of deposits. The gap
between loans and deposits is funded via (invested in) the money market. The main
result is that banks’ increase their intermediation margin with the uncertainty in money
market rates. Several models have extended the initial one, and shifted the uncertainty
from the long-term rates driving the market values of loans and deposits to the short-term
money market rates (McShane and Sharpe, 1985), included the credit risk of loan default
(Angbazo, 1997), and the operational cost of offering intermediation services (Maudos
and Fernández de Guevara, 2004). Additionally, the impact of cross-selling between two
different asset types has been investigated (Allen, 1988; Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007).
Cost-of-good-sold models included operating cost from the outset and derived their results
under differing forms of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion (Zarruk, 1989), capital regulation and
deposit insurance (Zarruk and Madura, 1992), and stronger forms of risk aversion as well
as credit risk (Wong, 1997). The impact on the intermediation margin with regard to
model features that are also included in the Ho-Saunders type models are, in general,
identical, although they depend on the form of risk aversion the bank faces.
Cost-of-good-sold models are pure theoretical contributions that derive comparative stat-
ics of the determinants of bank interest margins. In contrast, the Ho-Saunders type
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models — except for Allen (1988) — are tested empirically for different countries, time
periods, and bank margins, although they are most frequently applied to the net interest
margin as an accounting measure of bank income from classical financial intermediation
business.
In Chapter 3 “Determinants of Bank interest Margins: Impact of Maturity Transforma-
tion”, which is joint work with Oliver Entrop, Christoph Memmel, and Marco Wilkens, an
extension of the Ho-Saunders model is introduced that explicitly takes maturity transfor-
mation into account by introducing fixed-rate loans with a longer maturity than deposits.
We use a notation of the model in market values (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Allen, 1988)
and therefore not only allow for refinancing risk of rising interest rates. Our model also
captures the valuation risk that the market value of loans declines more heavily com-
pared to deposits given a positive parallel shift in the yield curve. This would lead to a
deterioration in the market value of equity. In practice, most supervisors monitor IRR
as a maximum loss of equity given a standardized interest rate shock. By allowing the
financial intermediary to charge the fees to cover the risk premia in advance (Freixas
and Rochet, 2008), our model also shows how banks’ pricing decisions are affected by
their expectations of financial gains from maturity transformation. Our model is then
tested for the first time on a sample of the German commercial banks between 2000-2009.
We are the first to test the Ho-Saunders type models predictions separately for interest
income and expense margins. Our findings suggest that the effects found for the net in-
terest margin rely heavily on the pricing of assets where banks charge premia for bearing
maturity-related IRR, but are also willing to pass parts of the profits expected from ma-
turity transformation back to borrowers. On the liability side, the theoretically derived
effects are more weakly pronounced and insignificant for most samples investigated.
Off-balance sheet interest rate risk management
The vast majority of, both, the theoretical and empirical hedging literature has focused on
corporate hedging decisions and their determinants. In a seminal study Smith and Stulz
(1985) show that hedging lowers cash flow variability. Without adequate cash flows a
company might have to forgo valuable investment projects. Froot et al. (1993) endogenize
the cost of bankruptcy by assuming that internally generated funds are cheaper compared
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to raising external capital. Additionally to bankruptcy risk, also liquidity risk is a major
determinant of hedging decisions (e.g., Mello and Parsons, 2000). Liquidity is of enormous
importance as the payments to counterparties from derivatives transactions designed to
decrease cash flow variability can trigger bankruptcy in states of low cash reserves (e.g.,
Rampini et al., 2012). Such effects may result in rationale market timing and gambling
behavior of financially constrained firms (Bolton et al., 2013). The research on bank
hedging is compared to corporate hedging of more limited size.
The focus of Chapter 3 has been how banks price IRR. Financial intermediation theory
stresses that banks should manage and price only those risks where they possess a moni-
toring advantage, but hedge all other risks. Therefore, banks should focus on credit risk
(Diamond, 1984; Froot and Stein, 1998) and the liquidity risk of early deposit withdrawal
(Hellwig, 1994). Our Ho-Saunders type model explained that it is not necessary to hedge
all IRR from loans and deposits, but that a balance-sheet hedge exists, where liabilities
do partly offset the IRR from the asset side.
In Chapter 4 “Market Timing, Maturity Mismatch, and Risk Management: Evidence
from the Banking Industry”, which is joint work with Oliver Entrop, Thomas Kick, and
Marco Wilkens, we empirically investigate German commercial banks’ IRR management
by simultaneously examining their on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet activities. The
research is based on the study conducted by Purnanandam (2007) for the U.S. banking
industry, and employs the estimators Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) used to explain
corporates’ hedging and speculative attempts when entering into interest rate swaps. The
study adds to the literature on how banks manage IRR off the balance sheet. Our findings
are generally in line with Purnanandam. The only exemption is found for the impact of
liquid assets on the propensity to use interest rate swaps. Differences between bank-based
and market-based financial systems in managing liquidity and interest rate risk through
liquid assets have been stressed by Allen and Gale (1997).
Although interest rate swaps are ideal for hedging IRR, they can also be used to speculate
on interest rate movements (e.g., Faulkender, 2005). A mild form of speculation — which
is, at the same time, related to hedging — is market timing when entering or closing
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swap positions. Such behavior refers to market views incorporated into risk management
decisions and is therefore also described as selective hedging. In line with expectations, we
find that banks are less likely to hedge with interest rate swaps when a steep yield curve
offers extra profits from maturity transformation. Uncertainty in the interbank markets,
however, induces banks to increase the extent of their IRR hedging. Consistent with the
bank risk taking channel, we find that banks hedge more when, at the same time, high
short-term rates make even short-term lending profitable.
The key finding of the study stems from tests of the endogeneity assumptions underlying
the simultaneous equations framework. Naturally, it would be assumed that the decisions
on the magnitude of the maturity mismatch and the extent of interest rate swaps are
endogenous decisions in managing the net IRR exposure. However, Durbin-Wu-Hausman
type tests cannot reject an exogenous relation for the decision to use interest rate swaps as
well as the extent of their use to the duration gap, except for banks that start using swaps
for the first time. We regard our results as driven by two effects: First, the maturity gap is
largely determined by borrowers’ liquidity needs, and the provision of long-term maturity
is facilitated by the high-standard property laws prevailing in Germany. Second, the use
of interest rate swaps, as the most common way to hedge IRR off the balance sheet, is
determined by the IRR regulation prevailing in Germany which has a fixed threshold
when it considers banks as “outliers” with excessive IRR.
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Chapter 3
Determinants of Bank Interest
Margins: Impact of Maturity
Transformation*
Abstract
This paper explores the extent to which interest risk exposure is priced in bank
margins. Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, we extend the Ho
and Saunders (1981) model to capture interest rate risk and expected returns from
maturity transformation. Banks price interest risk according to their individual
exposure separately in loan and deposit intermediation fees, but reduce (increase)
these charges for loans (deposits) when positive excess holding period returns from
long-term exposures are expected. Second, we test the model-derived hypotheses not
just for the commonly investigated net interest margin but also for interest income
and expense margins separately in a sample encompassing the German universal
banking sector between 2000 and 2009. We find that banks price their individual
interest rate risk and corresponding expected excess holding period returns via the
asset side into the net interest margin. For liabilities, we find interest rate risk
exposure is only priced by smaller, local banks.
* This chapter is based on the working paper Determinants of Bank Interest Margins: Impact of
Maturity Transformation by Entrop et al. (2012).
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3.1 Introduction
The theory of financial intermediation attributes a number of activities, commonly re-
ferred to as qualitative asset transformation, as core functions to banks (e.g. Bhattacharya
and Thakor, 1993). These activities encompass credit risk, liquidity and maturity trans-
formation.2 Maturity transformation evolves in most cases as a consequence of liquidity
provision when fixed-rate long-term loans are financed using short-term deposits. The
resulting maturity gap can be attractive to banks when term premia are present in the
yield curve — representing the well known “lure of interest rate risk” (Greenbaum and
Thakor, 2004, p. 138) — but it also increases their interest rate risk (IRR) exposure.
This exposure can be distinguished with regard to its effects in two forms (Hellwig, 1994):
First, reinvestment opportunity risk, i.e. the risk of having to roll over maturing contracts
at a possibly disadvantageous rate. Second, valuation risk, i.e. the risk that changes in
the yield curve reduce the net present value of a bank’s loan and deposit portfolio.
Recent financial intermediation theory suggests that banks operate with too high maturity
mismatches (e.g. Segura and Suarez, 2012; Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2012). Although
these models focus on financial intermediaries’ vulnerability to liquidity shocks like the
current financial crisis, they additionally verify intermediaries’ exposure to increasing
interest rates in “normal” times due to the interlinked roots of liquidity and maturity
transformation.3 Recently, discussions about the existence of the bank risk-taking chan-
nel (Borio and Zhu, 2012), i.e. that low levels of nominal policy rates induce financial
intermediaries to take higher risks (and increase leverage), have gained attention. There-
fore, discussions of new macroprudential regulatory frameworks include linking monetary
policy and banking regulation in such a way that central banks should be prompted to
consider higher policy rates once the current turmoil is over (e.g. Blanchard et al., 2010).
2 We will use the notion of maturity and term transformation interchangeably. Although maturity is
not the appropriate risk measure, maturity transformation evolved as a synonym for what can be
referred to more generally as term transformation. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) have already
addressed this issue.
3 For a brief theoretical comparison of interest rate and liquidity risk management see Brunnermeier
and Yogo (2009).
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Rising interest rates in response to such a change in central bank policy would directly
result in the aforementioned consequences of IRR.
Seminal models such as Ho and Saunders (1981) and Froot and Stein (1998) imply that
banks should charge intermediation fees for the risks they keep on-balance. This paper
examines the nexus between banks’ involvement in maturity transformation, their prof-
itability, and the intermediation fees they charge as risk compensation. First, we present
a theoretical model that allows an analysis of the determinants influencing fees when
banks engage in maturity transformation. Second, we test the model-derived hypotheses
empirically by examining bank margins.
For our analysis, we extend the dealership model initially developed by Ho and Saunders
(1981) to determine the factors that influence intermediation fees when a bank’s balance
sheet shows maturity mismatch. In the original Ho/Saunders model, a bank is viewed as a
pure intermediary between lenders and borrowers of funds that sets prices in order to hedge
itself against asymmetric inflows and outflows of funds. Assuming loans and deposits have
an identical maturity, IRR only arises when loan volume does not match deposit volume,
and the existing volume gap is closed using short-term money market funds. Rolling
over maturing short-term positions creates reinvestment (refinancing) opportunity risk.
Maximizing expected utility, the bank charges fees that increase with the volatility of
interest rates as a means of compensation for the potential losses.
We relax the assumption of equal loan and deposit maturity. In our model, loans and
deposits cannot then perfectly offset IRR, and exposure is not solely determined by interest
rate volatility, but additionally by the bank-individual exposure captured in the bank’s
maturity structure, i.e. its maturity gap. As a consequence, banks increase both loan
and deposit fees with increasing interest rate volatility, but they additionally increase
(lower) loan (deposit) fees with the size of the positive maturity mismatch. The economic
rationale behind the latter is that banks with higher interest risk exposure from holding
long-term loans in their portfolios charge higher loan fees as risk compensation and bid
more aggressively on deposits by lowering deposit fees rather than having to refinance
themselves in the very short-term money market.
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However, when positive valuation gains — so-called positive “holding period returns”
above the money market rate — from long-term exposures are expected, banks partly
reverse their pricing behavior, i.e. they lower (increase) loan (deposit) fees. The rationale
is that banks are already partly compensated for taking the risk from long-term loans by
these returns in expectation, which allows them to charge lower fees. For deposits, which
are also characterized by longer maturity than the money market account, the opposite
holds as this represents a liability position.
The sum of the loan and deposit fees is the net fee income which increases with interest
rate volatility and maturity mismatch and decreases with positive expected excess holding
period returns from maturity transformation, given banks have a positive maturity gap.
For the empirical analysis about the impact of maturity transformation on bank fees and
their determinants, we utilize a comprehensive dataset of the entire German universal
banking sector between 2000 and 2009. The German banking system is well-suited for
this analysis. First, as Germany is a bank-based financial system (e.g. Schmidt et al.,
1999), the majority of liquidity is provided via maturity transformation by financial in-
termediaries. The predominance of (long-term) fixed-rate loans intended to be held till
maturity instead of being securitized, and the high dependence on (demand and espe-
cially savings) deposits are specific characteristics of the German banking sector. There-
fore, German banks seem prone to IRR from maturity transformation (Memmel, 2011).
Second, IRR management is conducted more frequently on-balance compared to market-
based financial systems that rely more heavily on derivatives hedging.4 Risk management
is implemented through buffer stocks of liquid assets and the intertemporal smoothing of
non-diversifiable risks (Allen and Santomero, 2001), such as liquidity and interest risk,
as well as interbank lending in bank networks. The latter shield (smaller) banks in ma-
4 Allen and Santomero (2001) explain this difference between market-based systems, such as the U.S.,
and bank-based systems, such as Germany, drawing on the model of Allen and Gale (1997). The
lack of competition from financial markets is considered to be the basis for German financial inter-
mediaries’ ability to manage risk on-balance. Purnanandam (2007) finds that small U.S. commercial
banks likewise manage IRR less frequently via derivatives, but on-balance by adjusting their maturity
gap to interest rate changes.
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jor banking groups against monetary contractions, without having to reduce lending as
a consequence of large deposit outflows and drastic balance sheet duration adjustments
(Ehrmann and Worms, 2004).
In our empirical analysis we not only test the impact of the optimal loan and deposit fee
determinants on the commonly investigated net interest margin (NIM), but also are the
first to test the hypotheses for the the asset and liability side, i.e. interest income and
expense margins (IIM and IEM), separately. As model-derived optimal intermediation
fees economically represent the difference between bank-set interest rates and fair market
rates of the same maturity, we use detailed supervisory data on bank assets’ and liabilities’
maturities to create maturities-mimicking bond portfolios whose coupon payments control
for the impact of market rates on the respective margins in our analysis. This procedure
allows us to separate the impact of the theoretical determinants on the fee-part of the
margins.
We find the empirical results for the NIM to be consistent with our model-hypotheses, i.e.
net intermediation fees increase with the maturity gap and decrease with expected returns
from maturity transformation; however the effects of the expected return from maturity
transformation are minor. All margins positively depend on interest rate volatility. Dis-
entangling the NIM into IIM and IEM, we find strong evidence that banks price their
maturity gap and corresponding expected returns on the asset side; however, we find
the model-implied effects on the liability side only for cooperative banks. Our results,
therefore, imply that the effect found for the NIM are mainly driven by the asset side.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related litera-
ture on determinants of bank interest margins in Ho/Saunders-type models. In Section 3.3
we derive the theoretical model with differing loan and deposit maturities. An overview
of the data and the institutional characteristics of the German commercial banking sector
is provided in Section 3.4, where the variables used to proxy for the derived determinants
are also introduced. Section 3.5 presents the econometric model (Section 3.5.1) and the
empirical results. Institutional differences in the banking sector are taken into account
by investigating three different sub-samples, for savings, cooperative and other, mainly
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private commercial, banks. First, we examine the commonly investigated net interest
margin (Section 3.5.2), and then separately the interest income and expense margin (Sec-
tion 3.5.3). Section 3.5.4 investigates the extent to which the previously derived results
are robust with respect to the financial crisis. Section 3.6 presents our concluding remarks.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper is most related to the literature dealing with Ho/Saunders-type models. Ho
and Saunders (1981) model a monopolistic, risk-averse bank acting solely as an interme-
diary between lenders and borrowers of funds. Over a single-period planning horizon,
the bank’s objective is to maximize its utility of terminal wealth by charging demanders
of loans and suppliers of deposits fees for providing them with intermediation services.
The bank hands out a single type of loan and accepts a single type of deposit, which
are assumed to have the same maturity. Thus, financing all loans using deposits com-
pletely eliminates IRR. Intermediation services encompass the provision of immediacy, i.e.
accepting every transaction immediately, and not waiting until the opposite transaction
arrives to offset the risk. The lack of (excess) funds when new loans are demanded (de-
posits are supplied) forces the bank to adjust its money market positions. The maturity of
the money market is assumed to be short-term, below that of loans and deposits, and iden-
tical to the decision period. At the end of the decision period, money market accounts
have to be rolled over. Short (long) positions — a consequence of the loan exceeding
(falling below) the deposit volume — expose the bank to the refinancing (reinvesting)
risk of rising (falling) rates. For this reason, the fees charged should cover potential losses
from rolling over short-term funds.
A series of authors have extended the model: McShane and Sharpe (1985) shift interest
uncertainty from loan and deposit returns to money market rates. Switching the source
of risk involved a change from price to rate notation, which succeeding authors adopted.5
Allen (1988) considers two different types of loans with interdependent demand functions.
5 The change of the source of risk in McShane and Sharpe (1985) was motivated by the predominance
of variable-rate loans and deposits in Australia (p. 116, footnote 2).
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Carbó and Rodríguez (2007) regard this second asset as a non-traditional activity and
investigate how specialization and cross-selling behavior between assets influence several
bank spreads instead of focusing solely on interest margins. Angbazo (1997) additionally
attaches credit risk to the interest rate risk associated with the bank’s loan, and derives
a risk component that does not only depend on the volatility of risk sources, but also
on the co-movement thereof. The operating cost necessary to provide intermediation
services is taken into account by Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004). Finally,
Maudos and Solís (2009) combine the independently derived two-asset-type models and
all other extensions into a single integrated model.
3.3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we present an augmented dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981)
that explicitly includes maturity transformation due to loan maturity exceeding deposit
maturity. To incorporate the resulting valuation risk, loans and deposits are modeled
as fixed-rate contracts with different maturities, and thus with different sensitivities to
changes in the yield curve. We adopt the price notation of Ho and Saunders (1981) and
Allen (1988), and focus on the provision of a single loan and a single deposit to keep the
bank’s risk management decision simple.
The bank sets prices at which it is willing to grant loans (PL) and take in deposits (PD)
at the beginning of the decision period before the demand for loans and the supply of
deposits can be observed, and does not adjust them afterwards. Fees are set as mark-ups
a on deposits, and mark-downs b on loans, in relation to what the bank considers the
“fair” price , pD and pL, of the given transaction:
PD = pD + a, PL = pL − b. (3.1)
The fair price can be best thought of as the price of a coupon-paying bond with identical
risk characteristics as the underlying transaction. Assuming that only loans bear credit
risk, their fair price pL is that of a (corporate) bond with identical probability of default
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and recovery rate, whereas the fair price of a deposit pD corresponds to a default-free
(government) bond of identical maturity.
We assume that the bank charges (demands) rates equaling par yields, i.e. fair market
rates, of the underlying bond which implies the fair price of a new transaction is at par
when it is initiated. Consequently, the cost (and profits) of financial intermediation are
solely accounted for by the magnitude of the up-front fees a and b. Mark-ups a on deposits
and mark-downs b on loans result in an effective yield to maturity below that of bond
funding for deposits, and above that of bond investing for loans.6
The bank’s initial wealth portfolio W0 at the beginning of the period consists of three
different portfolios: (i) long positions in loans L, (ii) short positions in deposits D, and
(iii) money market funds M , which can take either long or short positions, all denoted in
market values:
W0 = L0 −D0 +M0. (3.2)
The length of the planning horizon T is shorter than the maturities of the loans and
deposits. Thus, the value of the loan and deposit portfolios in T are random due to
unexpected changes in the yield curve or in default risk, i.e. the returns until T of both
the loan and the deposit portfolio are subject to IRR, and the loan return additionally
to credit risk. Returns are the returns of the underlying bonds since intermediation fees
are not considered as they are charged in advance. Loans generate an expected rate of
return of rL, and deposits of rD until T . The uncertainty of returns will be captured in
stochastic terms Z˜. Interest rate risk in loans will be displayed as Z˜I , credit risk as Z˜C ,
and interest rate risk in deposits as Z˜D. All stochastic terms have an expected mean of
zero and are trivariate normally distributed N3 (0,
∑), with variance-covariance matrix∑. If loan maturity is assumed to exceed deposit maturity, normally-shaped yield curves
6 To illustrate bank pricing decisions, we give an example. Let us assume the bank offers a two year
deposit and the par yield of a two year bond equals 3%. The bank will pay this fair interest rate
to its depositors. However, the bank charges up-front intermediation fees a of, let us say, 1.5%, i.e.
any depositor has to hand in $101.5 for a claim guaranteeing the repayment of $100. By doing this,
the bank decreases the effective yield to maturity paid on deposits below the fair market rate of 3%.
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lead, in general, to higher (expected) returns on long-term bonds compared with short-
term bonds, i.e. rL > rD. In this case, loan values are more sensitive to changes in the
yield curve, and their return volatility is larger than that of deposits, i.e. σ2I > σ2D. The
rate of return on the money market account, on the contrary, is certain over the period
and denoted r.
Managing loan and deposit portfolios generates operating cost C each period, which are
monotonically increasing functions of the market values of the loan and deposit portfolios.
The bank’s end-of-period wealth is given by:
WT =
(
1 + rL + Z˜I + Z˜C
)
L0 −
(
1 + rD + Z˜D
)
D0 + (1 + r)M0 − C (L0)− C (D0) .
(3.3)
The bank maximizes expected utility. The utility function U(W ) is twice continuously
differentiable, with U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0 in order to reflect risk aversion. In line with the
previous literature, the expected end-of-period utility, EU (W ), is approximated using
second-order Taylor series expansion around the expected level of E (W ) = W and given
by:
EU (W ) = U
(
W
)
+ 12U
′′ (W) [(σ2I + 2σIC + σ2C)L20 − 2 (σID + σCD)L0D0 + σ2DD20] ,
(3.4)
where σIC denotes the covariance between the interest rate and credit risk of the loan
portfolio and σID (σCD) the covariance between the interest rate risk (credit risk) of the
loan and the interest rate risk of the deposit portfolio.
When a new deposit QD arrives, the overall volume of deposits increases to D0 + QD.
As attracting deposits equals selling bonds at a mark-up of a, the money market account
increases to M0 +QD(1 + a). Under the common assumption that second-order terms of
intermediation fees, expected returns and operating cost are negligible,7 the increase in
7 i.e. ([(1 + r) (1 + a)− (1 + rD)]QD − C (QD))2 = 0.
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expected utility due to a new deposit inflow is:8
∆EU (W |QD) =U ′
(
W
)
[[(1 + r) (1 + a)− (1 + rD)]QD − C (QD)]
+ 12U
′′ (W) [σ2D (2D0 +QD)QD − (σID + σCD)QDL0] . (3.5)
Similarly, new loan demand QL results in an increase in loans’ market values to L0 +QL,
and a decrease of the money market account to M0 − QL (1− b). The resulting increase
in expected utility under the same assumptions as before is:
∆EU (W |QL) =U ′
(
W
)
([(1 + rL)− (1− b) (1 + r)]QL − C (QL))
+ 12U
′′ [(σ2I + 2σIC + σ2C) (2L0 +QL)QL − 2 (σID + σCD)QLD0] .
(3.6)
The bank sets loan fees a and deposit fees b to cover unexpected losses from interest
rate and credit risk. However, increasing the magnitude of fees demanded will limit the
incentives of deposit supply as well as loan demand. Transaction volumes QD and QL are
exogenously determined, but the likelihood of a new transaction occurring will decrease
with the magnitude of fees and follows independent Poisson processes with intensity λ:
λD =αD − βD × a, (3.7)
λL =αL − βL × b. (3.8)
The bank’s objective function, conditional to, at most, a single transaction occurring, is
to set optimal intermediation fees so as to maximize its end-of-period expected utility:
max
a,b
EU (∆W ) = (αD − βD × a) ∆EU (W |QD) + (αL − βL × b) ∆EU (W |QL) . (3.9)
Rearranging first-order conditions, the optimal loan fee is
b∗ =12
αL
βL
+ 12
C (QL)
QL (1 + r)
− 12
rL − r
(1 + r)
− 14
U ′′
(
W
)
U ′
(
W
) [(σ2I + 2σIC + σ2C) (2L0 +QL)− 2 (σID + σCD)D0]
(1 + r) ,
(3.10)
8 Ho and Saunders (1981) and all succeeding models calculate the increase in net wealth to be a QD.
However, we choose the intermediation fees to be earned in advance and allow them to earn the risk-
free rate (see Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p. 232). The same approach is used for newly demanded
loans.
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and the optimal deposit fee
a∗ =12
αD
βD
+ 12
C (QD)
QD (1 + r)
+ 12
rD − r
(1 + r)
− 14
U ′′
(
W
)
U ′
(
W
) [σ2D (2D0 +QD)− 2 (σID + σCD)L0]
(1 + r) .
(3.11)
The optimal fees on loans a∗, and deposits b∗ both depend on four components: (i)
a market power, (ii) an operating cost, (iii) an expected excess holding period return,
and (iv) a risk component. Whereas previous models only observed the influence of three
components, the influence of the expected excess holding period returns (rL−r) and (rD−
r), respectively, has been newly derived. This effect as well as the new special structure of
the risk component originate from the bank’s risk transformation, encompassing maturity
transformation, as introduced in our model.
Market power: The competitive structure of the banking industry is determined by
the extent to which (the likelihood of) loan demand and deposit supply are inelastic
with respect to the intermediation fees charged, represented by the factor β. With an
increasing ratio of α/β, elasticity decreases and banks gain market power which translates
into higher fees.
Operating cost: The average operating cost incurred per unit of transaction volume,
C (Q) /Q, is passed on to lenders and borrowers as in a standard monopolistic setting.
Expected excess holding period returns: In addition to cost, banks also take ex-
pected excess holding period returns from risk transformation into account when setting
loan and deposit fees, which is a new result derived from our model. With positive ex-
pected excess holding period returns over the horizon T , i.e. (rL−r > 0) and (rD−r > 0),
respectively, loan fees are reduced and deposit fees increased. This means banks are willing
to lower loan fees during those times when granting loans is expected to generate positive
risk transformation income above the risk-free rate (in the form of the coupon payments
of the underlying bond and possible valuation gains). Other things being equal, higher
expected excess returns compensate the bank more for risk-taking and allows a lowering
of the loan fees demanded from the customer for covering unexpected losses. For deposits,
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the opposite holds, resulting in increased intermediation fees, as they represent a liability
position.
Qualitatively, we observe the same effect for expected excess returns as for operating cost
when a monopolistic supplier (demander) determines the profit-maximizing price in the
Monti-Klein model of financial intermediation: expected excess holding period returns in
loans can be regarded as reductions in marginal cost and the expected profits are passed
on to customers in the same way as marginal costs are priced (Freixas and Rochet, 2008,
pp. 57-59), and vice versa for deposits.
Risk component: The risk component consists of the product of the bank’s absolute
risk aversion (−U ′′/U ′) and the bank’s overall risk exposure from the balance sheet side
perspective the transaction is related to. Given positive risk exposure, banks facing higher
levels of risk aversion charge higher fees.
Equations (3.11) and (3.10) reveal that fees increase with the total risk exposure of the
balance sheet side the initiated transaction belongs to, and decrease with the hedging
ability of the opposite balance sheet side. More specifically, loan fees increase with loan’s
interest (σ2I ) and credit risk (σ2C), as well as their covariance, and the volume of loans
affected by such risks after the transaction occurs (L0 + QL). However, fees are reduced
when deposits hedge loan’s risk, i.e. by increasing covariance of the loan’s risk and the
interest risk inherent in deposits, (σID + σCD), weighted by the volume of deposits D0.
When deposits are being priced, the opposite holds.
Ignoring credit risk, i.e. σ2C = σIC = σCD = 0, the risk exposure in loan fees behaves very
much like a bank’s (modified) duration gap. The modified duration gap measures the bank
balance sheet’s sensitivity to (small) changes in the yield curve by accounting for volume-
weighted net effect of interest rate changes on assets’ and liabilities’ present values. Ceteris
paribus, it increases with a higher (shorter) maturity of the loans (deposits). Qualitatively,
the same holds for the risk components: We have σID = σ2I when loans and deposits have
the same maturity; thus, interest rate risk of loans and deposits offset each other in this
case, with the exception of volume-effects. When the loan maturity increases, we can
expect higher σ2I and a reduced hedging ability of the deposits as the correlation between
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respective returns tends to decrease with a higher maturity difference. This implies the
risk component increases, yielding higher loan fees b∗.
For the risk component in deposit fees analogous considerations hold; however, it is linked
to a reverse duration gap as it measures the risk of the deposit portfolio less the hedging
ability of the loan portfolio. This implies the deposit fee a∗ decreases with an increasing
duration gap. The economic rationale is that banks with high IRR from holding long-term
loans in their portfolios would be willing to bid more aggressively on deposits by offering
more favorable rates.
In sum, loan and deposit fees are determined by the same four components introduced
above. Market power, operating cost and the risk component have a positive impact on
fees charged. Positive expected excess holding period returns show a positive effect on
loan fees and a negative effect on deposit fees, as a result of the opposed positions — long
vs. short — of their underlying portfolios.
As previous literature has focussed on the pure intermediation spread s∗, defined as the
sum of both intermediation fees, i.e. s∗ = a∗ + b∗, its determinants are illustrated below:
s∗ =12
(
αL
βL
+ αD
βD
)
+ 12
(
C (QL)
QL (1 + r)
+ C (QD)
QD (1 + r)
)
− 12
rL − rD
(1 + r)
− 14
U ′′
(
W
)
U ′
(
W
) [(σ2I + 2σIC + σ2C) (2L0 +QL)− 2 (σID + σCD) (D0 + L0) + σ2D (2D0 +QD)]
(1 + r) .
(3.12)
It should be noted that the pure spread solely encompasses fees related to transaction
uncertainty (Ho and Saunders, 1981) but does not fully represent the net interest income
(NIM) in our model. Owing to the different maturities of loans and deposits, the interest
payments from the underlying bonds do usually not offset each other but contribute to
the NIM as well.
The same four components, found separately in loan and deposit fees, also influence the
pure spread. Market power and operating cost are simply the sum of the terms found
in loan and deposit fees, and can be interpreted as the bank’s overall market power, and
operating cost from financial intermediation, respectively. The expected excess holding
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period returns determining loan and deposit fees (partly) offset each other and translate
into (rL− rD), the expected holding period return from overall risk transformation. (rL−
rD) can be expected to take positive values in times of normally-shaped yield curves due
to, in general, a positive maturity transformation. Hence, the bank is willing to lower
overall fees when it expects positive returns from maturity transformation. The combined
risk component rises in both the loan’s and the deposit’s risks, always weighted by the
new business volume after the transaction takes place, (L0 +QL) and (D0 +QD), and is
reduced by the covariance hedges times the volume of the total initial interest-bearing
business, i.e. (D0 + L0).
3.4 Data
3.4.1 The German Banking System
To empirically test the predictions derived from our theoretical model, we utilize a dataset
covering the entire German commercial banking sector for a range of ten years between
2000 and 2009.9 The time span contains substantial variation in the yield curve, with
steep and considerably flat term structures following each other.
The German banking system is structured into three pillars where affiliation to a certain
pillar is determined by ownership (e.g. Brunner et al., 2004). The three pillars are private
commercial banks, state-owned banks and banks of the cooperative sector. The majority
of these banks belong to the last two pillars. State-owned savings and cooperative banks
operate in geographically delimited areas and there is almost no competition between them
across local banking markets. In an international context, they are small to medium-sized
with only limited direct access to the capital market. The business models of these banks
are very homogeneous and mainly consist of pure intermediation services, as assumed in
the model. Net interest income corresponds to the largest fraction of their earnings and
income from maturity transformation contributes substantially to this (Memmel, 2011),
whereas non-interest fee, and especially trading income are of only limited importance.
9 Data for 1999 is used to create instruments from first-differenced covariates.
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As a general rule, savings and cooperative banks access capital markets not indepen-
dently, but mainly through the head institutions of their respective interbank networks.
The head institutes provide liquidity supply to their affiliated members and allow them to
manage their duration gaps through interbank lending. These interbank networks shield
the smaller savings and cooperative banks against monetary contractions, without having
to reduce lending as a consequence of deposit outflows and drastic balance sheet dura-
tion adjustments (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004). The mitigated impact of the monetary
transmission channel allows us to investigate interest margins that are only moderately
affected by changes in the volume of interest-bearing business.
We investigate the full German universal banking sector, leading to a broad sample of
more than 2,000 banks and 16,000 bank years. Such a sample size, though limited to a
single country, exceeds most of the international studies on determinants of bank margins
conducted so far (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999); Saunders and Schumacher
(2000); Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004); Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) —
except for Carbó and Rodríguez (2007) and Nguyen (2012), who have a bigger sample
size).
Although only limited data is publicly available, using supervisory data we can utilize
detailed information on a bank’s lender and borrower characteristics and maturities. The
data used in this analysis is based on the following supervisory data collected by the
Deutsche Bundesbank: balance sheet figures are taken from year-end values of the monthly
balance sheet statistics, cost and revenues from bank’s earning statements, and additional
bank-specific information stems from the auditor’s reports. Macroeconomic and term
structure data are those provided to the public on the Deutsche Bundesbank’s website.
Earlier data cannot be used due to a major change in the reporting structure of the
monthly balance sheet statistics in 1998.
A further point that has to be taken into account is the treatment of mergers and the
effect thereof on the comparability of pre- and post-merger accounting figures. During the
sample period, the German banking sector was affected by a major consolidation wave,
resulting in several hundred mergers, most notably among savings and cooperative banks.
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In order to account for structural changes in the time series of variables following mergers,
a new synthetic bank is created after every merger. Thus, for a single merger between
two different banks, three synthetic banks exist: two pre-merger banks and another post-
merger one.
To capture differences originating from the institutional characteristics in the banking sec-
tor, we initially conduct our analysis on the complete sample, however we subsequently
divide it into three sub-samples. Although the three pillars would provide a good pre-
specified segmentation, we place the head institutions of the state-owned (mainly Landes-
banken) and of the cooperative pillar together with all private commercial banks into a
group, from now on referred to as “other banks”. The rationale behind this institutional
relocation is the differences between head institutions and their affiliated savings and co-
operative banks with regard to size, business model, capital market access, but also IRR
management (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004).
3.4.2 Variables
The dependent variables we investigate are (i) the net interest margin (NIM), (ii) the
interest income margin (IIM), and (iii) the interest expense margin (IEM), where total
assets, interest-earning assets, and interest-paying liabilities, respectively, have been cho-
sen as denominators. If the denominator of explanatory variables is adjusted in line with
the dependent variable being investigated this will be displayed as “total (interest-bearing)
assets (liabilities)” in the following analysis.
It should be noted that these dependent variables are not equivalent to the (optimal) loan
and deposits fees from the theoretical model, but encompass them. The interest income
and expenses from new loan and deposit transactions observed at the end of the period
are the par yield coupon payment of a risky long-term corporate bond plus the loan fees,
and the par yield coupon payment of a shorter-term default-free government bond less
the deposit fee, respectively.
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This generates two implications for our empirical design. First, we need to control for
coupon payments of fairly-priced capital market bonds as they are included in the de-
pendent variables by construction. We will do this via so-called “revolving portfolios” of
bonds, mimicking the maturity structure of the bank. Second, interest expenses and the
deposit fees a∗ derived from the model are negatively linked. Hence, empirical proxies for
deposit fee determinants should exhibit the opposite of the theoretically derived impact.10
The following sub-sections describe the variables proxying for the determinants derived
from the model, additional bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables, and the
construction of the revolving portfolios. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the explanatory
variables included in the regression analysis, their expected impact on the three bank
margins and the usage in previous studies investigating bank margins.
3.4.2.1 Model-derived Variables
Market power: We include Lerner indices to capture banks’ ability to exercise market
power from facing inelastic demand for loans and supply of deposits. As the model implies
a positive influence of market power on loan and deposit margins b∗ and a∗, we expect
a positive influence of the Lerner indices on IIM and NIM, and a negative influence on
IEM.
The Lerner index measures banks’ ability to set mark-ups over the marginal cost mc
necessary to provide a service in relation to the price p charged, i.e. (p−mc) /p. To
estimate a bank’s overall market power, we estimate a single-output translog cost function
dependent on three input factors (see e.g. Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004;
Maudos and Solís, 2009). Total assets are specified to proxy for output level. Input prices
for personnel, physical and financial costs are included. Taking interest-paying liabilities
as an input rather than an output is consistent with the intermediation approach of
banking (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). The output price p is exogenously determined and
10 However, for better interpretability we will employ modified duration gaps, instead of reverse mod-
ified duration gaps.
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proxied as interest income in relation to interest-earning assets, and therefore identical to
the IIM. Equity is included as a netput. Appendix A provides further technical details.
To derive separate market power estimates for loan and deposit markets from aggregated
balance sheet and income data, we follow Maudos and Fernández de Guevara’s (2007)
approach, and specify a two-output translog cost function. This approach is based on the
Monti-Klein model of financial intermediation (Freixas and Rochet, 2008, pp. 57-59) and
treats deposits as an output rather than an input. Interest-earning assets proxy for loans,
and interest-paying liabilities for deposits, with the ratios of interest income / interest-
earning assets (IIM), and interest expenses / interest-paying liabilities (IEM) providing
the exogenously determined two output prices. With liabilities being treated as outputs,
only personnel and physical costs contribute to input prices.
Operating cost: Following Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), and Maudos and
Solís (2009), we proxy the operating cost of financial intermediation using total operating
expenses / total (interest-bearing) assets (liabilities). However, it should be noted that
banks’ operating expenses are likely to also include costs that are due to inefficiency and
those not related to activities of financial intermediation. Operating expenses are expected
to have a positive influence on intermediation fees and, thus, a positive (negative) influence
on IIM and NIM (IEM).
Expected excess holding period returns: Theoretically derived expected excess hold-
ing period returns cover returns from total risk transformation. However, in line with pre-
vious research, we neglect expected returns from credit risk and focus on excess holding
period returns in “default-free” government bonds. Fama and French (1989) and Ilmanen
(1995) provide empirical evidence that the term spread proxies expected excess holding
period returns.11 Therefore, Equations (3.11) and (3.10) imply that loan fees a∗ are re-
duced, and deposit fees b∗ are increased when term spreads increase. This translates into
expected negative effects on all three bank margins to be examined.
11 See Campbell and Ammer (1993) for a theoretical justification. Alternative approaches document
the power of current forward rates (Fama and Bliss, 1987), or linear combinations of forward rates
(Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005) to forecast future excess returns.
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As different banks have different maturity transformation characteristics and thus different
expected excess holding period returns in their assets and liabilities, we do not use the
same term spread for all banks, but calculate bank-specific term spreads. For example,
given an upward-sloping yield curve, banks with higher average loan maturity should have
higher expected excess holding period returns rL− r. To capture this effect, we calculate
the duration of the interest-bearing assets and the par yield of government bonds with a
maturity equaling this duration. The bank-specific term spread for the assets, proxying
rL−r, is then defined as the difference between this duration-implied par yield and the 6-
month par yield. The liability term spread is calculated analogously and the asset-liability
term spread, proxying rL − rD, is the difference between the duration-implied asset and
liability par yields. The calculation of assets’ and liabilities’ durations is analogous to the
calculation of the modified duration, described in Appendix B.
Risk component: The composite impact of the risk component will be separated into
the influence of distinct variables for our empirical analysis: risk aversion, interest and
credit risk.
Risk component — Risk aversion: Most previous studies include capital ratios as
proxies for risk aversion (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara,
2004; Maudos and Solís, 2009), or, without directly referring to risk aversion, as measures
of insolvency risk (Angbazo, 1997; Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007). As capital ratios do not
account for differing risk levels, a point already stressed by Gambacorta and Mistrulli
(2004), capital in excess of minimum regulatory requirements / total assets, or in short
excess capital, generally seems a more adequate proxy for risk aversion. In our model,
excess capital should be related to higher IIM and NIM, and lower IEM. However, em-
pirical studies using capital ratios to investigate the NIM found mixed results, with both
significantly positive as well as negative effects.
Risk component — Interest rate risk: As already discussed in Section 3.3, the second
factor in the risk component behaves very much like a (reverse) modified duration gap.
Using the detailed information on volumes and maturities of different lender and borrower
types, we calculate the modified durations of the assets and liabilities, DAmod and DLmod,
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respectively; then, the modified duration gap Dgap is defined as:12
Dgap = DAmod −DLmod
total interest-earning liabilities
total interest-paying assets . (3.13)
Details can be taken from Appendix B. We use the modified duration gap as an indepen-
dent variable for all three margins for better comparability rather than using a reverse
modified duration gap in the case of IEM. Based on our model, we expect a positive
influence on all three margins.
Whereas the modified duration gap measures the overall sensitivity of a bank’s net portfo-
lio value to changes in the yield curve, it does not capture the interest rate volatility that
determines the probability of changes in the yield curve. For multicollinearity reasons, we
do not include separate volatility measures for loans and deposits, σI and σD. Instead,
we include just one: the annual volatility of weekly 6-month LIBOR rates — measured
over a 52-week window — to proxy for the risk of unexpected changes in the yield curve.
It should be noted that previous studies, based on models with the assumption of equal
loan and deposit maturity, modeled IRR only as the volatility of specific interest rates (Ho
and Saunders, 1981; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara,
2004; Maudos and Solís, 2009). The model implies all three margins increase with higher
volatility.
Risk component — Credit risk: The credit risk associated with financial intermedi-
ation is integrated into the regression analysis using risk-weighted assets to total assets.
Whereas for the other banks risk-weighted assets are likely to be also associated with
off-balance sheet activities and market risk, they are mainly determined by the default
risk of loan and bond portfolios for many savings and cooperative banks. With deposits
assumed to be default-free, the proxy is only used in regressions explaining IIM and NIM,
and expected to have a positive impact.
12 Angbazo (1997) uses the one-year repricing gap, defined as the difference between assets and liabilities
with a repricing frequency of less than one year to total assets (first used by Flannery and James,
1984). In our analysis we prefer to use more detailed information on the maturities of assets and
liabilities as one-year repricing gaps will capture the majority of liquidity and refinancing interest
risk, but only partly the valuation risk when long-term securities are affected by interest rate changes.
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Risk component — Credit-interest risk covariance: To proxy for the covariance
between credit and interest rates we include the correlation coefficient between the 5-year
government par yield and the default spread of a weighted index of corporate bonds over
the 5-year government par yield. The correlation is calculated annually on the basis of
weekly rates. Whereas the IIM and the NIM are determined by both the correlation of
loan as well as deposit returns with the credit spread, the IEM is only determined by
σ2CD. Therefore, the expected coefficient sign can only be predicted for the IEM and can
be expected to increase the expenses paid by the bank.
3.4.2.2 Control Variables
Previous studies investigating bank interest margins include a number of additional control
variables not predicted by the model to influence the pure spread of intermediation, but
to also have an impact on observed bank margins. Following these studies, we include
three additional bank-specific, as well as two macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, we
control for coupon payments of fairly-priced capital market bonds as they are included in
the dependent variables.
Non-interest income (NII): Past developments in banking are described as disinterme-
diation with a change from traditional financial intermediation to other banking activities
in order to compensate for declining profitability. Carbó and Rodríguez’s (2007) model
investigates the cross-selling behavior between loans and non-traditional activities, which
have been proxied using non-interest net fee income to total (interest-bearing) assets (li-
abilities) (Lepetit et al., 2008).13 Cross-selling assumes that banks are willing to forego
traditional interest-generating income for non-interest income (NII). Hence, the higher the
non-interest income to total assets, the lower the corresponding fees charged, resulting in
decreasing IIM and NIM, and increasing IEM.
Implicit interest payments (IIP): We also include a proxy for implicit interest pay-
ments (IIP) using (non-interest expenses less non-interest income) / total (interest-bearing)
13 In contrast to Lepetit et al. (2008), we do not additionally include trading activities as many smaller
German banks to not generate any such income.
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assets (liabilities) that aims to reflect the cost of additional services for which customers
have not been charged. Initially included to capture competition in the market for de-
posits (Ho and Saunders, 1981), it is expected to result in lower interest expenses and a
negative coefficient on the related margin and a positive one on NIM. However, additional
services might also be present for loans, and a positive effect on the IIM might also be
observed.
Opportunity cost of holding reserves (OCR): Finally, the opportunity cost of hold-
ing reserves (OCR) originates in asset portfolios that pay no, or in the case of central bank
deposits in Germany, only below market rates. We include cash and deposits with central
banks to total (interest-bearing) assets (liabilities) to proxy for OCR. As these reserves
implicitly increase the cost of funding by foregone interest income, they are likely to be
priced into deposit rates. A higher ratio of cash and deposits with central banks can
therefore be expected to lead to lower interest expenses and ultimately higher net interest
incomes; however, the effect on interest income margins remains unclear a priori.
Macroeconomic variables: Two macroeconomic variables are included: the annual real
GDP growth rate controls for demand (for loans) and supply (of deposits) effects in bank
profitability, and the inflation rate integrates effects of nominal contracting. For both
variables, positive as well as negative coefficients have been observed when investigating
bank NIMs (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008; Alber-
tazzi and Gambacorta, 2009) depending on the banking sample and time period observed,
so no a priori assumption of the coefficient sign derived will be given.
Revolving portfolios: As already discussed at the beginning of Section 3.4.2 we have to
control for fair coupon payments from the underlying bonds, captured in the dependent
variables, to separate the effects of the fee determinants our model predicts. Since today’s
interest income and expenses depend on both volume and current as well as former fair
market rates for different maturities — depending on the points in time current on-balance
positions have been conducted — we build revolving portfolios of bonds with different
maturities initiated at different points in time. Since credit risk premia are controlled for
by the credit risk variable we consider default-free government bonds.
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We make use of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly balance sheet statistics which report
volumes for different lender and borrower clienteles in time brackets according to the
initial time to maturity, as shown in Table B.1. The strategy of revolving portfolios
basically consists in revolvingly investing into par-yield government bonds whose initial
maturity depends on the respective balance sheet position’s maturity bracket. We assume
initial maturity is equally distributed within each bracket, each bond pays par-yield when
initiated, and maturing bonds are replaced by new bonds of the same maturity. The
resulting coupon payments represent weighted moving averages of par-yields as shown by
Memmel (2008). They are calculated for each position and time bracket and are — divided
by interest-paying assets, interest-paying liabilities, or total asset, respectively — used
as control variables when investigating NIM, IIM, and IEM.14 Memmel (2008) provides
empirical evidence that this approach explains much of the time series and cross-sectional
variation of banks’ interest income and expense margins. Further details can be taken
from Appendix C.
3.4.3 Summary Statistics
We employ a dataset of the entire German commercial banking sector, but exclude syn-
thetic banks if (i) they have missing values for one of the above-stated variables; (ii)
showed negative values for any balance sheet position that could not be negative. For es-
timating non-negative marginal cost in translog cost functions we additionally completely
excluded synthetic banks whose (iii) input prices differed by more than 2.25 times the
standard deviation in a given year, and (iv) whose assets are below EUR 25 million. This
leaves us with a total sample of 2,380 (synthetic) banks, 594 of which are savings, 1,730
14 As the reported maturity brackets for assets and liabilities do not have matching maturities, we
cannot create net revolving portfolios for every single bracket — used in explaining income and
expenses — when analyzing the net interest margin. Therefore, in this case we create three net
product group revolving portfolios by combining revolving portfolios for bank, non-bank, and bond
lending and then subtracting those for borrowing. Savings accounts are added to non-bank borrowing
and subordinated debt to bonds issued.
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cooperative, and 56 so called other, mainly private commercial banks. Table 3.2 provides
summary statistics for the overall sample and the sub-samples.
There are some noteworthy features in the data, especially highlighting differences between
the sub-samples of savings and cooperative banks, and the remaining banks in the other
bank sample. Average total assets are EUR 1,018 million, but range from EUR 395 million
for cooperative banks to EUR 9,077 million for other banks. The overall sample median,
however, is only EUR 329 million, serving as evidence that a huge number of small banks
operate in the German banking system, whereas averages are driven by a small number of
large institutions. Savings and cooperative banks samples are comparatively homogeneous
with respect to size, whereas the other bank sample is much more heterogeneous. Duration
gaps are higher for savings and cooperative banks, which have interest sensitivities of 0.84
and 0.9, respectively, compared with other banks with only 0.64. Net interest income
margins range from 2.03% for savings, and 2.48% for cooperative to 2.58% observed for
other banks. However, the standard deviation of NIM is more than three times as high for
other banks as for cooperatives. The smaller savings and cooperative banks rely to a larger
extent on savings deposit funding, which corresponds to 32.6% and 33.7%, respectively,
of total assets, whereas other banks show a quota of only 16.9%. Revisiting that half of
the savings deposit are considered to be long-term core deposits, it is striking that savings
and cooperative banks still have substantially larger duration gaps.
As other banks have the highest net interest income despite the fact that they are less
heavily involved in maturity transformation, they seem to earn major parts of their interest
income through credit risk premia. And indeed, other banks have higher credit risk ratios
of RWA to total assets: 63.2% compared to 55.3% and 60.2% for savings and cooperative
banks, respectively.
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3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Econometric Model
Previous studies mainly focused on an investigation of the net interest margin (NIM) as
a widely used measure of commercial banks’ core business profitability.15 Empirical find-
ings have been compared to the theoretical determinants derived for the pure spread. As
Ho-Saunders-type models derive determinants for loan and deposit fees independently, we
can test the related hypotheses for loans and deposits separately. We are the first to addi-
tionally examine the influence of the model-derived factors on the interest income margin
(IIM) and the interest expense margin (IEM) separately. The reduced form regression
equation of the model is given by:
BMit = αi +
J∑
j=1
βjTM jit +
K∑
k=1
γkBSkit +
L∑
l=1
δlMElt +
M∑
m=1
ηmRPmit + εit (3.14)
for t = 1, ..., T , indicating the time period, and i = 1, ..., N as the number of banks in the
sample.16 BM is the bank margin examined and will be one of the three bank margins in-
troduced. TM refers to the vector of variables determined by the theoretical model. BS is
a vector of additional bank-specific control variables that are likely to influence empirically
observed bank margins, but are not part of our model. ME represents macroeconomic
variables with a common influence on bank margins. Finally, RP represents the vector of
revolving portfolios.
All regressions are estimated using fixed effects two-stage least squares (2-SLS) instru-
mental variables (IV) techniques. As output prices for Lerner indices (and in the case of
15 Exemptions are, e.g. Carbó and Rodríguez (2007), who use a wider definition of bank margins
and also include New Empirical Industrial Organizations margins, and Lepetit et al. (2008), who
investigate several different definitions of bank spreads.
16 Ho and Saunders (1981) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000) estimate the model in a two-step
procedure that aims to derive the pure spread from the first-step regressions. The pure spread is
considered to be the intercept from a regression of the NIM on all factors not explicitly derived from
the model. Focusing on interest risk, in our setting we prefer the single-step approach as it allows
the revolving portfolios and the variables proxying for the interest risk in the intermediation fees to
be correlated.
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overall market power indices, also the input price of financial cost) were estimated on the
basis of those variables that they should now explain, we instrument Lerner indices with
their own first difference. Furthermore, non-interest income (NII) might be endogenous
for reasons of reversed causality, when banks are willing to grant more favorable interest
conditions in order to stimulate the cross-selling of fee-generating business (Maudos and
Solís, 2009). As Anderson-Rubin F -tests reject the hypothesis of NII being exogenous, we
also instrument it with its own first difference. We investigate the relevance of the instru-
ments, testing for underidentification (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) and weak identification
based on the Cragg-Donald F -statistic. Tests for underidentification can be rejected for
all samples and all margins at convenient levels. The test statistic for weak identification
is calculated for clustered standard errors and based on the rank test of Kleibergen and
Paap. The critical value of the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument size test with two
exactly identified endogenous regressors based on heteroskedastic Cragg-Donald statistic
is 7.03. All samples except for the other bank sample, which has by far lower sample size,
reject the weak instrument hypothesis. For the NIM and the IIM, the test statistics for
the complete sample statistics display always the highest value, indicating that the low
statistics for the other bank sample are driven by sample size. Results are displayed for
all samples, both as coefficients from level-on-level regressions and as elasticities. The
coefficients for elasticities have been multiplied by the factor 10 for better visibility.
3.5.2 Net Interest Margin
First, in line with most of the previous literature we investigate the net interest margin
and display our results in Table 3.3. Our interest is focused on the explanatory vari-
ables determining the pure intermediation spread (3.12) in our theoretical model, namely
the bank’s market power, operating costs, expected excess holding period returns, risk
aversion, interest rate risk and credit risk, and the correlation between these two risks.
The Lerner indices as a proxy for market power are highly significant and have a strong
impact: An increase by 10% leads to an increase in the net interest margin by nearly
11%. This effect is especially pronounced for savings banks (increase in the NIM by
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Net Interest Margin (NIM)
Total sample (i) Savings banks (ii) Cooperative banks (iii) Other banks (iv)
Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast.
Model-determined variables
Lerner index (overall) 0.070*** 10.932 0.075*** 14.076 0.076*** 11.280 0.056*** 7.599
(0.0041) (0.0063) (0.0047) (0.0141)
Operating cost 1.391*** 13.223 1.727*** 15.769 1.618*** 15.560 0.758*** 7.393
(0.1073) (0.1845) (0.1009) (0.2648)
Term spread (asset-
liability)
-0.041*** -0.011 -0.046*** -0.010 -0.046*** -0.014 -0.057 -0.002
(0.0064) (0.0115) (0.0070) (0.0437)
Excess capital 0.046*** 0.663 0.098*** 1.410 0.041*** 0.594 0.036* 0.438
(0.0051) (0.0126) (0.0047) (0.0200)
Duration gap 0.180*** 0.699 0.284*** 1.215 0.201*** 0.766 0.034 0.085
(0.0214) (0.0470) (0.0276) (0.1449)
LIBOR volatility 1.014*** 1.520 1.168*** 2.040 1.080*** 1.542 0.861*** 1.168
(0.0712) (0.1238) (0.0770) (0.2323)
Credit risk 0.007*** 1.772 0.007*** 1.862 0.007*** 1.783 0.005 1.315
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0039)
Credit-interest covariance 0.028*** 1.021 0.030*** 1.302 0.032*** 1.119 0.019*** 0.636
(0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0068)
Bank-specific variables
NII -1.357*** -3.889 -3.347*** -9.392 -1.548*** -4.427 -0.430 -1.557
(0.1505) (0.4140) (0.1252) (0.3414)
IIP -0.458*** -2.603 -0.585*** -3.194 -0.623*** -3.614 -0.027 -0.118
(0.0639) (0.1161) (0.0606) (0.1491)
OCR 0.003 0.013 -0.010 -0.038 0.019 0.076 -0.037 -0.058
(0.0103) (0.0248) (0.0129) (0.1442)
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth -0.118*** -0.478 -0.091*** -0.421 -0.154*** -0.595 -0.066** -0.257
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0267)
Inflation rate 0.620*** 4.368 0.654*** 5.364 0.723*** 4.850 0.456*** 2.879
(0.0478) (0.0686) (0.0552) (0.1496)
Revolving portfolios
Net loans to / from banks 0.007 0.008 0.133*** 0.393 -0.078** -0.037 0.110 0.022
(0.0295) (0.0348) (0.0343) (0.0955)
Net business to / from non-
banks
-0.044** -0.008 0.047** 0.057 -0.123*** -0.074 0.120* 0.121
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0267) (0.0658)
Net bond portfolios -0.127*** -0.380 -0.219*** -0.849 -0.175*** -0.481 -0.025 -0.056
(0.0377) (0.0603) (0.0414) (0.1201)
Obs. 16,396 4,479 11,524 393
Number of synthetic banks 2,380 594 1,730 56
GR2 0.536 0.459 0.592 0.382
Underid. LM stat. [p-val] 71.18 [0] 40.48 [0] 52.91 [0] 7.459 [0.006]
Cragg-Donald F -test 58.23 30.28 43.55 5.405
Dependent variable: net interest margin (NIM). Operating cost, non-interest income (NII), opportunity cost of reserves
(OCR) and implicit interest payments (IIP) are in relation to total assets. All models have been estimated using fixed
effects 2-SLS IV regressions, where Lerner index (overall) and NII have been instrumented with their own first differences.
Underid. gives the LM statistic and the p-value for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank test of underidentification. Cragg-
Donald F -test gives the Cragg-Donald statistic based on Kleibergen and Paap’s rank of the matrix. Elasticities of variables
are displayed on the right next to coefficients and have been calculated at sample mean and multiplied by the factor 10.
Elasticities have been estimated using chain rules, and have been multiplied by -10 if evaluated at a negative sample mean.
Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at bank level. Significance at the 10%/5%/1%-level is marked
by */**/***. GR2 is the generalized R2 criterion of Pesaran and Smith (1994) for 2-SLS IV estimation.
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14%) and significant for all sub-samples. The higher impact of market power on the NIM
underlines the fact that many rural savings and cooperative banks only face competition
from a single bank of the other pillar as these banks operate in delimited areas and have
only a few branches of private commercial banks in their area, allowing them to charge
higher fees.
The operating costs are highly significant as well. The positive sign of the coefficients is
in line with the model predictions and the magnitude of the coefficients is economically
relevant: an increase by 100 basis points in operating costs translates into an increase of
139 basis points in the NIM, for savings banks the increase amounts as much as to 173
basis points.
Regarding the term spread included as an instrument for expected returns from maturity
transformation, we find the expected negative coefficients. The coefficient is significant
for savings and cooperative banks, though it is even larger for other banks. From an
economic point of view the results confirm that banks pass part of the expected holding
period returns on to customers during times when an increasing yield curve, controlled
for with revolving portfolios, generates earnings from maturity transformation. However,
this effect is economically not very relevant: about a 4 to 6 basis points reduction in fees
for a 100 basis points change in the term spread.
In a similar vein, the interest risk proxies also have to be interpreted as additional net fee
income. In line with our expectations, we find that savings and cooperative banks earn
significant extra charges of 28 and 20 basis points for each additional percentage point
of interest sensitivity due to a positive maturity gap. Other banks, in contrast, have a
coefficient close to zero, so that a significant impact can be rejected for more than solely
small sample size. Similar results are reported for U.S. banks by Angbazo (1997) who
finds the one-year repricing gap to be related exclusively to smaller regional banks’ NIMs,
but not to larger money centered banks. During the period from 2005 to 2009, Memmel
(2011) estimates the income generated from maturity transformation to be around 30
basis points for savings and cooperative banks, and 7 basis points for other banks. Hence,
the risk premia charged in fees are of a similar magnitude and supplement these earnings.
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LIBOR volatility, proxying the macroeconomic risk of unexpected changes in the yield
curve, is priced significantly in all banking samples and confirms the results of previous
studies investigating banks’ NIM. Fees charged are about 100 basis points per percentage
point of realized volatility, and are the highest for savings banks.
Credit risk is priced with lower magnitude, but is not significant for other banks, though
the inference might suffer from the overly small sample size here. Given positive risk
components, as found by the positive coefficients described above, we find positive effects
of excess capital for all the samples investigated. The impact of the correlation between
interest and credit risk is positive, but only of limited economic magnitude.
Summarizing the results for the net intermediation fee income, we find that our model
predictions hold. Fees are (somewhat) reduced when positive returns form maturity trans-
formation are expected. Macroeconomic and microeconomic interest rate risk, i.e. LIBOR
volatility and bank-specific duration gap, are priced. Whereas all this holds for the total
sample as well as for savings and cooperative banks, we sometimes find a lack of signif-
icance for other banks which may be due to the overly small sample size in some cases.
However, whereas the LIBOR volatility has a clear impact for other banks, the impact
of duration gap is insignificant and the coefficient very small. Given that other banks
include (large) private commercial banks whose business is less traditional, and which
have better access to capital markets and are, thus, more likely to manage their smaller
duration gap via derivatives rather than on-balance, this result seems plausible.
3.5.3 Separation of Interest Income and Interest Expenses
In this section, we separately run the regressions for the interest income margin (IIM,
see Table 3.4) and the interest expense margin (IEM, see Table 3.5). Controlling for fair
coupon payments from the underlying bonds via revolving portfolios makes it possible,
based on Equations (3.10) and (3.11), to test the model-derived hypotheses for the loan
and deposit fee separately. This analysis also reveals which balance sheet side, loans or
deposits, drives the results discovered for the NIM in Section 3.5.2. When we run the
separate regressions, the share of explained variation (the generalized R2) increases —
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compared to the regression for the net interest margin — from around 0.54 to 0.87 in
both cases.
Lerner indices are significant for both interest income and interest expenses, indicating
that banks can exploit their market power by increasing intermediation fees on both the
asset and the liability side, as predicted by our model. Comparing the magnitude of
the coefficients and elasticities, the results imply that market power has a much greater
impact on the asset than on the liability side.
By contrast, operating costs seem to be solely priced on the liability side. Whereas the
coefficients are insignificant or, at most, weakly significant on the asset side, we find highly
significant coefficients (except for the sub-sample of other banks) on the liability side.
The term spread, as an indicator of in how far banks price expected excess holding period
returns, reveals the expected negative coefficient on the asset side, and here the effect is
even bigger than the one observed for the net interest income. Banks are willing to lower
loan fees by 9 to 17 basis points for a 100 basis point steepness in the yield curve. For
liabilities, contrary to the model predictions, we find positive coefficients, though only
significant for the sub-sample of cooperative banks. Moreover, the size of the coefficients
(0.01 to 0.02) and elasticities (0.002 to 0.004) are economically negligible.
Similar effects can be observed for the pricing of on-balance interest rate risk measured
by the duration gap. For the asset side, we find the expected positive and significant
(except for other banks) coefficients (0.37 and 0.57 for savings and cooperative banks,
respectively). This implies banks charge extra intermediation fees when a long-term loan
exposes them to interest rate risk from maturity transformation. This fee also increases
with the risk of unexpected changes in the yield curve, measured by LIBOR volatility,
with coefficients ranging from 0.93 to 1.67. For the liability side, the duration gap also
has positive coefficients (0.005 to 0.08) but they are only significant for cooperative banks.
The LIBOR volatility has a positive and significant (except for other banks) impact on
fees as well; however, these volatility coefficients and elasticities are much smaller than
those for the asset side.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Interest Income Margin (IIM)
Total sample (i) Savings banks (ii) Cooperative banks (iii) Other banks (iv)
Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast.
Model-determined variables
Lerner index (assets) 0.051*** 4.680 0.044*** 4.204 0.056*** 5.042 0.065*** 5.338
(0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0115)
Operating cost -0.083* -0.381 0.100 0.391 -0.032 -0.154 -0.161 -0.787
(0.0478) (0.1269) (0.0268) (0.2421)
Term spread (asset) -0.155*** -0.153 -0.090*** -0.092 -0.155*** -0.152 -0.168* -0.164
(0.0175) (0.0217) (0.0251) (0.0860)
Excess capital 0.046*** 0.287 0.039*** 0.208 0.060*** 0.394 -0.006 -0.034
(0.0056) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0219)
Duration gap 0.337*** 0.564 0.370*** 0.588 0.567*** 0.976 -0.046 -0.054
(0.0505) (0.0673) (0.0715) (0.1335)
LIBOR volatility 1.501*** 0.967 0.993*** 0.644 1.445*** 0.930 1.671*** 1.045
(0.1049) (0.1227) (0.1346) (0.2797)
Credit risk 0.020*** 2.178 0.020*** 2.070 0.017*** 1.927 0.019** 2.193
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0095)
Credit-interest covariance -0.010*** -0.150 -0.009*** -0.144 -0.009*** -0.138 -0.014*** -0.217
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0031)
Bank-specific variables
NII 0.570*** 0.793 1.250*** 1.509 0.427*** 0.618 0.618* 1.132
(0.0879) (0.3546) (0.0812) (0.3514)
IIP 0.239*** 0.656 0.152* 0.355 0.184*** 0.536 0.404** 0.877
(0.0332) (0.0778) (0.0189) (0.2005)
OCR 0.101*** 0.186 0.118*** 0.188 0.099*** 0.196 -0.145 -0.114
(0.0124) (0.0317) (0.0156) (0.1259)
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth 0.081*** 0.140 0.055*** 0.095 0.098*** 0.171 0.126*** 0.227
(0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0323)
Inflation rate 0.283*** 0.856 0.250*** 0.760 0.265*** 0.801 0.235*** 0.683
(0.0233) (0.0315) (0.0326) (0.0721)
Revolving portfolios
Loans to banks
daily 2.208*** 0.589 2.207*** 0.320 2.465*** 0.762 2.120*** 0.793
(0.1171) (0.1460) (0.1744) (0.3395)
≤ 1 y. 1.976*** 0.454 2.042*** 0.530 2.112*** 0.434 1.828*** 1.126
(0.0997) (0.1340) (0.1425) (0.2509)
> 1 y. ≤ 5 y. 1.626*** 0.278 1.680*** 0.124 1.717*** 0.362 1.784*** 0.124
(0.0706) (0.1082) (0.0996) (0.4567)
> 5 y. 1.217*** 0.199 1.310*** 0.194 1.229*** 0.212 1.028*** 0.078
(0.0518) (0.0805) (0.0642) (0.3521)
Loans to non-banks
≤ 1 y. 2.162*** 1.052 3.012*** 1.338 2.750*** 1.312 1.505*** 1.836
(0.1653) (0.2245) (0.1546) (0.2596)
> 1 y. ≤ 5 y. 1.551*** 0.615 1.590*** 0.399 1.636*** 0.711 1.243*** 1.131
(0.0647) (0.1441) (0.0699) (0.2858)
> 5 y. 1.120*** 4.942 1.015*** 4.866 1.089*** 4.721 1.185*** 2.806
(0.0252) (0.0303) (0.0263) (0.2162)
Bonds held
≤ 1 y. 0.778*** 0.011 1.002*** 0.016 0.782*** 0.011 -1.651 -0.016
(0.0894) (0.1451) (0.1002) (1.1166)
> 1 y. ≤ 2 y. 0.974*** 0.043 1.155*** 0.062 1.077*** 0.044 0.669 0.039
(0.0629) (0.0762) (0.0771) (0.5095)
> 2 y. 0.607*** 0.883 0.765*** 1.222 0.570*** 0.805 0.316** 0.351
(0.0221) (0.0486) (0.0239) (0.1360)
Obs. 16,396 4,479 11,524 393
Number of synthetic banks 2,380 594 1,730 56
GR2 0.866 0.896 0.890 0.648
Underid. LM stat. [p-val.] 92.89 [0] 52.59 [0] 48.90 [0] 7.764 [0.005]
Cragg-Donald F -test 118.4 70.15 48.20 5.191
Dependent variable: interest income margin (IIM). Operating cost, non-interest income (NII), opportunity
cost of reserves (OCR) and implicit interest payments (IIP) are in relation to interest-earning assets. All
models have been estimated using fixed effects 2-SLS IV regressions, where Lerner index (assets) and NII
have been instrumented with their own first differences. Underid. gives the LM statistic and the p-value
for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank test of underidentification. Cragg-Donald F -test gives the Cragg-
Donald statistic based on Kleibergen and Paap’s rank of the matrix. Elasticities of variables are displayed
on the right next to coefficients and have been calculated at sample mean and multiplied by the factor 10.
Elasticities have been estimated using chain rules, and have been multiplied by -10 if evaluated at a negative
sample mean. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at bank level. Significance at the
10%/5%/1%-level is marked by */**/***. GR2 is the generalized R2 criterion of Pesaran and Smith (1994)
for 2-SLS IV estimation.
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Interest Expense Margin (IEM)
Total sample (i) Savings banks (ii) Cooperative banks (iii) Other banks (iv)
Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast.
Lerner index (deposits) -0.010*** -0.822 -0.014*** -1.122 -0.008*** -0.704 -0.019*** -1.792
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0035)
Operating cost -0.190*** -1.679 -0.388*** -2.649 -0.209*** -2.018 -0.042 -0.418
(0.0358) (0.0536) (0.0152) (0.2087)
Term spread (liabilities) 0.010** 0.017 0.009 0.016 0.022*** 0.037 0.017 0.030
(0.0049) (0.0085) (0.0050) (0.0467)
Excess capital -0.001 -0.016 0.014*** 0.135 -0.002 -0.026 -0.035*** -0.366
(0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0026) (0.0114)
Duration gap 0.042** 0.135 0.012 0.035 0.082*** 0.280 0.005 0.011
(0.0177) (0.0293) (0.0188) (0.1204)
LIBOR volatility 0.125*** 0.156 0.097*** 0.114 0.111*** 0.142 0.091 0.107
(0.0147) (0.0220) (0.0143) (0.1442)
Credit-interest covariance -0.006*** -0.186 -0.006*** -0.181 -0.006*** -0.192 -0.012*** -0.333
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0028)
NII 0.365*** 0.976 1.252*** 2.627 0.397*** 1.140 -0.039 -0.143
(0.0858) (0.1368) (0.0348) (0.3519)
IIP 0.050** 0.265 0.135*** 0.552 0.048*** 0.279 -0.028 -0.122
(0.0198) (0.0430) (0.0108) (0.1570)
OCR -0.034*** -0.120 -0.010 -0.028 -0.038*** -0.149 -0.065 -0.103
(0.0076) (0.0144) (0.0071) (0.0734)
GDP growth 0.007** 0.024 0.006 0.020 0.003 0.011 0.092*** 0.309
(0.0034) (0.0052) (0.0030) (0.0322)
Inflation rate -0.022*** -0.128 0.020*** 0.109 -0.043*** -0.262 0.007 0.036
(0.0062) (0.0075) (0.0051) (0.0483)
Revolving portfolios
Loans from banks daily 0.889*** 0.049 1.076*** 0.107 0.813*** 0.025 0.836*** 0.172
(0.0504) (0.0659) (0.0687) (0.1828)
≤ 1 y. 0.798*** 0.126 0.906*** 0.248 0.657*** 0.058 1.201*** 0.877
(0.0693) (0.0408) (0.0429) (0.1346)
> 1 y. ≤ 2 y. 0.671*** 0.022 0.733*** 0.028 0.563*** 0.016 1.174*** 0.121
(0.0576) (0.0946) (0.0762) (0.2031)
> 2 y. 0.869*** 1.938 0.975*** 2.639 0.919*** 1.902 1.014*** 1.287
(0.0246) (0.0271) (0.0215) (0.1108)
Loans from non-banks daily 0.848*** 2.013 1.177*** 2.475 0.761*** 1.887 1.061*** 2.698
(0.0327) (0.0538) (0.0299) (0.1609)
≤ 1 y. 0.971*** 1.363 1.040*** 0.880 0.926*** 1.479 1.217*** 2.961
(0.0209) (0.0434) (0.0192) (0.1401)
> 1 y. ≤ 2 y. 1.045*** 0.226 1.113*** 0.131 0.973*** 0.250 1.198*** 0.259
(0.0474) (0.0961) (0.0434) (0.3650)
> 2 y. 0.848*** 0.823 0.914*** 0.792 0.839*** 0.840 0.867*** 1.132
(0.0396) (0.0464) (0.0306) (0.1307)
Subordinated debt 0.908*** 0.079 0.498*** 0.099 1.938*** 0.078 1.375 0.113
(0.1238) (0.1336) (0.2632) (1.2662)
Saving accounts ≤ 3 m. 0.809*** 3.550 0.927*** 3.561 0.782*** 3.674 0.891*** 1.893
(0.0164) (0.0290) (0.0152) (0.1052)
> 3 m. 0.777*** 0.760 0.905*** 1.039 0.752*** 0.693 0.956*** 0.582
(0.0182) (0.0318) (0.0199) (0.1703)
Bonds issued ≤ 1 y. 0.143 0.001 -0.140 -0.001 0.300 0.001 0.591 0.008
(0.1977) (0.2632) (0.3571) (1.0066)
> 1 y. ≤ 2 y. 0.213** 0.007 0.058 0.002 0.265*** 0.009 1.231 0.023
(0.0918) (0.1608) (0.0999) (1.5459)
> 2 y. 0.437*** 0.175 0.400*** 0.147 0.521*** 0.219 0.903* 0.229
(0.0424) (0.0707) (0.0439) (0.4808)
GR2 0.869 0.882 0.883 0.787
Underid. LM stat. [p-val.] 98.66 [0] 207.5 [0] 606.3 [0] 7.966 [0.005]
Cragg-Donald F -test 88.79 218.3 2516 5.619
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Dependent variable: interest expense margin (IEM). Operating cost, non-interest income (NII), opportunity cost
of reserves (OCR) and implicit interest payments (IIP) are in relation to interest-paying liabilities. All models
have been estimated using fixed effects 2-SLS IV regressions, where Lerner index (deposits) and NII have been
instrumented with their own first differences. Underid. gives the LM statistic and the p-value for the Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rank test of underidentification. Cragg-Donald F -test gives the Cragg-Donald statistic based on
Kleibergen and Paap’s rank of the matrix. Elasticities of variables are displayed on the right next to coefficients
and have been calculated at sample mean and multiplied by the factor 10. Elasticities have been estimated using
chain rules, and have been multiplied by -10 if evaluated at a negative sample mean. Standard errors are given in
parentheses and are clustered at bank level. Significance at the 10%/5%/1%-level is marked by */**/***. GR2 is
the generalized R2 criterion of Pesaran and Smith (1994) for 2-SLS IV estimation.
Concerning a bank’s risk aversion, measured by its excess capital, positive and significant
(except for other banks) coefficients are found on the asset side. However, results (sign
and significance) are mixed for the liability side.17
Credit risk has the expected positive sign and is significant. The correlation between
interest and credit risk is significantly negative for both the asset and liability side. The
positive effect on the NIM is, therefore, explained by the higher magnitude of the elas-
ticities on the liability side. However, the negative coefficients contradict the model’s
predictions.
To summarize, in line with our model predictions, we find that loan fees depend negatively
on expected holding period returns and positively on macroeconomic interest rate risk
(LIBOR volatility) and microeconomic duration gaps. This means that banks pass part
of the positive expected holding period returns to customers but price higher risk charges
when loans compound a large duration gap and when interest rate uncertainty is high.
On the liability side, we do not find an economically relevant impact of expected excess
holding period returns. This suggests that banks do not charge higher fees in deposits
as a means of compensation for higher valuation risk compared to funding in the money
market. However, we find strong evidence that macroeconomic interest rate risk is priced.
Our results on the impact of the duration gaps are mixed, suggesting that the effect, if
it exists, is not strong and only valid for the smallest of the banks in our sample, i.e.
cooperative banks. The different pictures for assets and liabilities imply that the results
for the NIM are mainly driven by the asset side.
17 Focusing on short-term bank rates rather than intermediation fees in Italy, Gambacorta (2008) finds
that high endowments of excess capital lead to significantly different loan rate adjustments, however
not for deposit rates, which is consistent with our results.
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3.5.4 Impact of Financial Crisis
The last two years of our sample period 2000 to 2009 are years of financial turmoil.
Although the German banking system was on the whole less affected than other systems,
some of our results might have been influenced by this time of high uncertainty. To
analyze possible effects, we repeat the regressions from Tables 3.3 to 3.5, but additionally
interact the variables we are most interested in, i.e. term spread, duration gap, and
LIBOR volatility with a dummy for the crisis years 2008 and 2009. We also interact
excess capital as a proxy for risk aversion that may play an important role in crisis times.
It should be noted as the LIBOR volatility is not bank-specific, any estimation of the
impact of the interacted LIBOR volatility may suffer from the absence of cross-sectional
variation since it covers only two years in the time series dimension.
Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 report the results for the NIM, the IIM, and IEM, respectively.
For the sake of brevity, they do so only for the model-derived variables. In the following,
we concentrate our analysis on the four variables which we interacted.
First, examining results for the NIM in Table 3.6 we find the non-interacted coefficients
of the term spread are again negative, and in general slightly more pronounced and of
the same significance compared to the whole sample period reported in Table 3.3. They
range from -0.07 for savings and cooperative banks to -0.055 for other banks. The inter-
acted coefficients capturing the diverging impact during the financial crisis are positive
and exceed those previously presented in terms of their magnitude (from 0.381 to 0.126).
The respective sums of both coefficients (e.g., -0.07 + 0.381 = 0.311 for savings banks)
represent the pricing impact during the financial crisis. They are positive and tests are
highly significant (p-values are provided on the bottom of the table) for all but the other
bank sample. This suggests that the negative impact of the term spread on net interme-
diation fees — as predicted by our model — holds but was distorted during the financial
crisis.
Analogous analyses for the remaining variables show that microeconomic duration gap
and the macroeconomic LIBOR volatility keep their sign and significance in the crisis
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Net Interest Margin (NIM) with Crisis Interactions
Total sample (i) Savings banks (ii) Cooperative banks (iii) Other banks (iv)
Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast.
Lerner index (overall) 0.073*** 11.496 0.073*** 13.688 0.077*** 11.405 0.059*** 7.957
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0144)
Operating cost 1.345*** 12.785 1.417*** 12.935 1.507*** 14.493 0.824*** 8.031
(0.0898) (0.1362) (0.0860) (0.2701)
Term spread (asset-
liability)
-0.065*** -0.018 -0.070*** -0.016 -0.070*** -0.021 -0.055 -0.002
(0.0068) (0.0110) (0.0071) (0.0479)
Term spread × Crisis 0.317*** 0.080 0.381*** 0.118 0.334*** 0.081 0.126 0.015
(0.0315) (0.0491) (0.0315) (0.1553)
Excess capital 0.061*** 0.885 0.112*** 1.613 0.055*** 0.796 0.026 0.322
(0.0048) (0.0112) (0.0048) (0.0174)
Excess capital × Crisis -0.005** -0.019 -0.017*** -0.065 -0.004* -0.015 0.047* 0.095
(0.0024) (0.0065) (0.0026) (0.0254)
Duration gap 0.248*** 0.963 0.285*** 1.222 0.237*** 0.903 0.129 0.327
(0.0229) (0.0444) (0.0304) (0.1649)
Duration gap × Crisis -0.068*** -0.058 -0.090** -0.085 -0.055 -0.046 -0.051 -0.026
(0.0255) (0.0418) (0.0350) (0.0912)
LIBOR volavility 1.604*** 2.405 1.616*** 2.824 1.676*** 2.392 1.107*** 1.502
(0.0773) (0.1105) (0.0896) (0.2895)
LIBOR volatility × Crisis -0.927*** -0.363 -0.829*** -0.388 -1.041*** -0.387 -0.705*** -0.220
(0.0613) (0.1055) (0.0710) (0.1659)
Credit risk 0.000 0.121 0.002 0.500 0.000 0.046 0.001 0.277
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0046)
Credit-interest covariance 0.021*** 0.757 0.020*** 0.856 0.023*** 0.784 0.017*** 0.571
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0063)
Significance in crisis
Term spread [p-val.] 80.22 [0] 49.38 [0] 87.07 [0] 0.203 [0.652]
Excess capital [p-val.] 155.2 [0] 114.2 [0] 125.1 [0] 6.302 [0.012]
Duration gap [p-val.] 56.71 [0] 16.52 [0] 43.61 [0] 0.280 [0.596]
LIBOR volatility [p-val.] 76.19 [0] 40.20 [0] 33.45 [0] 2.227 [0.136]
Obs. 16,396 4,479 11,524 393
Number of synthetic banks 2,380 594 1,730 56
GR2 0.552 0.483 0.607 0.391
Underid. LM stat. [p-val.] 90.63 [0] 59.02 [0] 63.96 [0] 7.709 [0.006]
Cragg-Donald F -test 77.88 47.76 57.08 5.671
Variables previously denoted Bank-specific variables, Macroeconomic variables, and Revolving portfolios have been included
in the regressions, but are, for the purpose of brevity, not displayed. Term spread (asset-liability), Excess capital, Duration
gap, and LIBOR volatility have additionally been interacted with a crisis dummy, indicating the years 2008 and 2009.
Significance in crisis reports values and p-values of the Wald test of the sum of the parameters of the non-interacted
variable and the variable interacted with the crisis dummy (variable × crisis). All models have been estimated using fixed
effects 2-SLS IV regressions, where the specific Lerner index and NII (not displayed) have been instrumented with their
own first differences. Underid. gives the LM statistic and the p-value for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank test of
underidentification. Cragg-Donald F -test gives the Cragg-Donald statistic based on Kleibergen and Paap’s rank of the
matrix. Elasticities of variables are displayed on the right next to coefficients and have been calculated at sample mean and
multiplied by the factor 10. Elasticities have been estimated using chain rules, and have been multiplied by -10 if evaluated
at a negative sample mean. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at bank level. Significance at the
10%/5%/1%-level is marked by */**/***. GR2 is the generalized R2 criterion of Pesaran and Smith (1994) for 2-SLS IV
estimation.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Interest Income Margin (IIM) with Crisis Interactions
Total sample (i) Savings banks (ii) Cooperative banks (iii) Other banks (iv)
Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast.
Lerner index (assets) 0.060*** 5.455 0.049*** 4.695 0.066*** 5.954 0.067*** 5.565
(0.0041) (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0120)
Operating cost -0.395*** -1.817 -0.370*** -1.452 -0.530*** -2.563 -0.159 -0.778
(0.0624) (0.1284) (0.0599) (0.2509)
Term spread (asset) -0.199*** -0.198 -0.139*** -0.143 -0.161*** -0.158 -0.171* -0.166
(0.0237) (0.0271) (0.0288) (0.0930)
Term spread × Crisis 0.386*** 0.108 0.300*** 0.089 0.618*** 0.171 -0.615* -0.114
(0.0714) (0.0795) (0.0771) (0.3487)
Excess capital 0.041*** 0.254 0.040*** 0.212 0.056*** 0.366 -0.014 -0.079
(0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0199)
Excess capital × Crisis -0.006 -0.009 0.003 0.004 -0.016*** -0.024 0.028 0.026
(0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0040) (0.0401)
Duration gap 0.375*** 0.627 0.449*** 0.714 0.520*** 0.895 0.083 0.097
(0.0464) (0.0884) (0.0742) (0.1051)
Duration gap × Crisis -0.047 -0.017 -0.110** -0.039 -0.041 -0.015 0.153 0.036
(0.0323) (0.0499) (0.0310) (0.1318)
LIBOR volatility 3.389*** 2.185 2.355*** 1.527 3.641*** 2.345 3.154*** 1.973
(0.2598) (0.2704) (0.3861) (0.6412)
LIBOR volatility × Crisis -3.261*** -0.550 -2.530*** -0.439 -3.852*** -0.646 -1.687** -0.243
(0.2968) (0.3122) (0.4097) (0.7597)
Credit risk 0.008*** 0.850 0.010*** 1.069 0.005*** 0.508 0.015* 1.666
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0084)
Credit-interest covariance -0.036*** -0.574 -0.030*** -0.476 -0.043*** -0.677 -0.027*** -0.407
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0063)
Significance in crisis
Term spread [p-val.] 6.532 [0.011] 5.583 [0.018] 60.32 [0] 4.594 [0.032]
Excess capital [p-val.] 22.80 [0] 19.35 [0] 35.82 [0] 0.0883 [0.766]
Duration gap [p-val.] 37.93 [0] 18.09 [0] 50.95 [0] 2.737 [0.098]
LIBOR volatility [p-val.] 0.567 [0.451] 1.650 [0.199] 6.255 [0.012] 14.97 [0]
GR2 0.868 0.896 0.891 0.661
Underid. LM stat. [p-val.] 72.75 [0] 36.73 [0] 37.00 [0] 7.797 [0.005]
Cragg-Donald F -Test 97.96 62.26 37.08 5.171
Variables previously denoted Bank-specific variables, Macroeconomic variables, and Revolving portfolios
have been included in the regressions, but are, for the purpose of brevity, not displayed. Term spread,
Excess capital, Duration gap, and LIBOR volatility have additionally been interacted with a crisis dummy,
indicating the years 2008 and 2009. Significance in crisis reports values and p-values of the Wald test of
the sum of the parameters of the non-interacted variable and the variable interacted with the crisis dummy
(variable × crisis). All models have been estimated using fixed effects 2-SLS IV regressions, where Lerner
index and NII (not displayed) have been instrumented with their own first differences. Underid. gives the LM
statistic and the p-value for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank test of underidentification. Cragg-Donald
F -test gives the Cragg-Donald statistic based on Kleibergen and Paap’s rank of the matrix. Elasticities
of variables are displayed on the right next to coefficients and have been calculated at sample mean and
multiplied by the factor 10. Elasticities have been estimated using chain rules, and have been multiplied
by -10 if evaluated at a negative sample mean. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered
at bank level. Significance at the 10%/5%/1%-level is marked by */**/***. GR2 is the generalized R2
criterion of Pesaran and Smith (1994) for 2-SLS IV estimation.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Interest Expense Margin (IEM) with Crisis Interactions
Total sample (i) Savings banks (ii) Cooperative banks (iii) Other banks (iv)
Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast. Coeff. Elast.
Lerner index (deposits) -0.010*** -0.894 -0.017*** -1.381 -0.009*** -0.775 -0.021*** -1.957
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0039)
Operating cost -0.235*** -2.080 -0.582*** -3.971 -0.264*** -2.546 -0.055 -0.543
(0.0459) (0.0686) (0.0211) (0.2125)
Term spread (liabilities) 0.009* 0.015 -0.010 -0.017 0.027*** 0.045 0.010 0.018
(0.0048) (0.0093) (0.0049) (0.0528)
Term spread × Crisis -0.034 -0.011 -0.043 -0.014 -0.048** -0.016 0.008 0.002
(0.0211) (0.0390) (0.0231) (0.2283)
Excess capital 0.004 0.051 0.034*** 0.326 0.002 0.020 -0.028** -0.291
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0028) (0.0131)
Excess capital × Crisis -0.008*** -0.023 -0.022*** -0.055 -0.002 -0.005 -0.038 -0.067
(0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0272)
Duration gap 0.018 0.059 -0.024 -0.069 0.036* 0.125 -0.055 -0.121
(0.0189) (0.0335) (0.0192) (0.1103)
Duration gap × Crisis 0.050** 0.036 -0.007 -0.005 0.125*** 0.093 0.205** 0.090
(0.0214) (0.0313) (0.0235) (0.0849)
LIBOR volatility 0.321*** 0.401 0.674*** 0.791 0.317*** 0.407 0.319 0.375
(0.0496) (0.0610) (0.0354) (0.2413)
LIBOR volatility × Crisis -0.275*** -0.090 -0.657*** -0.206 -0.486*** -0.162 -0.408 -0.110
(0.0819) (0.1150) (0.0784) (0.4426)
Credit-interest covariance -0.009*** -0.268 -0.014*** -0.399 -0.009*** -0.293 -0.015*** -0.440
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0051)
Significance in crisis
Term spread [p-val.] 1.430 [0.232] 1.868 [0.172] 0.878 [0.349] 0.006 [0.939]
Excess capital [p-val.] 1.203 [0.273] 3.732 [0.053] 0.004 [0.952] 5.379 [0.020]
Duration gap [p-val.] 8.350 [0.004] 0.612 [0.434] 34.61 [0] 0.938 [0.333]
LIBOR volatility [p-val.] 0.723 [0.395] 0.0421 [0.837] 6.887 [0.009] 0.071 [0.790]
GR2 0.869 0.883 0.884 0.792
Underid. LM stat. [p-val.] 91.07 [0] 173.6 [0] 561.3 [0] 8.188 [0.004]
Cragg-Donald F -Test 72.30 195.4 1314 6.048
Obs. 16,396 4,479 11,524 393
Number of synthetic banks 2,380 594 1,730 56
Variables previously denoted Bank-specific variables, Macroeconomic variables, and Revolving portfolios
have been included in the regressions, but are, for the purpose of brevity, not displayed. Term spread,
Excess capital, Duration gap, and LIBOR volatility have additionally been interacted with a crisis dummy,
indicating the years 2008 and 2009. Significance in crisis reports values and p-values of the Wald test of
the sum of the parameters of the non-interacted variable and the variable interacted with the crisis dummy
(variable × crisis). All models have been estimated using fixed effects 2-SLS IV regressions, where Lerner
index and NII (not displayed) have been instrumented with their own first differences. Underid. gives the LM
statistic and the p-value for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank test of underidentification. Cragg-Donald
F -test gives the Cragg-Donald statistic based on Kleibergen and Paap’s rank of the matrix. Elasticities
of variables are displayed on the right next to coefficients and have been calculated at sample mean and
multiplied by the factor 10. Elasticities have been estimated using chain rules, and have been multiplied
by -10 if evaluated at a negative sample mean. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered
at bank level. Significance at the 10%/5%/1%-level is marked by */**/***. GR2 is the generalized R2
criterion of Pesaran and Smith (1994) for 2-SLS IV estimation.
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years, except for other banks where LIBOR volatility becomes insignificant. Likewise for
savings and cooperative banks, the initial coefficient of LIBOR volatility is reduced by
more than 50% during the financial crisis.
Regarding excess capital, we find that the financial crisis had no economically relevant
impact in the case of savings and cooperative banks. For the sample of other banks,
non-interacted coefficients are insignificant, but adding the interacted coefficient turns
the overall effect significantly positive with a p-value of 1.2%. This implies the overall
effect for other banks found in Table 3.3 is mainly driven by the financial crisis, a time
when equity was of the greatest value to them.
Turning to the disentangled results for interest income and expenses in Table 3.7 and
3.8, we see that the positive effect of the term spread on the NIM during the crisis
years is driven by the asset side. Non-interacted coefficients are significantly negative
for the IIM in all samples, in line with expectations. However, high positive interacted
coefficients (except for other banks) overcompensate these effects during the financial
crisis. Only in the case of other banks are the interacted coefficients highly negative, and
therefore strengthening the negative impact observed for the non-interacted coefficients.
By contrast, for liabilities, the sum of coefficients capturing the effect of the term spread
during the financial crisis is not significant in any regression. During normal times, again,
we observe slightly positive significant coefficients solely for cooperative banks, as already
shown in Table 3.5.
For the duration gap, in qualitative terms, we find the same results for the asset side
as in our previous analyses. It is positively priced in both normal times and the crisis
years, expect for other banks due to insignificant effects. On the liability side, we find the
expected positive coefficients during normal times solely for the cooperative banks sample.
However, interacted coefficients are significantly positive for cooperative and other banks
and almost four times as high as in the non-interacted case. The overall effect during the
financial crisis, i.e. the sum of coefficients, is positive and significant for the cooperative
banks. The significance in the other bank sample might again suffer from the small sample
size. This suggests that many banks with a higher duration gap reduced deposit fees in
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the crisis years in order to stabilize their funding at a time when external finance, in
general, was more expensive.
A surprising effect can be found for LIBOR volatility, however as mentioned above this
has to be interpreted with caution. Whereas the non-interacted coefficients for both
the asset and liability side are positive and significant as in the previous analyses of
Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the interacted coefficients are negative and highly significant, leading
to an insignificant combined effect in most cases. On the asset side, the effect only
remains significant for other banks, however turns significantly negative for cooperatives.
Remembering the reduced coefficients found for the NIM, the analysis suggests banks were
not able to price the record high volatility in interbank market rates during the financial
crisis in the same magnitude as LIBOR volatility during normal times.
With regard to excess capital endowments, against the predictions of the theoretical
model we find still a significantly positive impact for cooperative banks on the liability
side. However, the crisis led to a significant reduction in the previously observed effect.
For other banks, the crisis enforced the pricing of equity in line with the model, i.e. excess
capital leads to reductions in interest expenses. On the asset side, no significantly different
pricing pattern can be observed.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze how interest risk exposure from maturity transformation is
priced in banks’ intermediation fees. We extend the theoretical dealership model of Ho
and Saunders (1981) to incorporate loans and deposits with differing maturities, making
the bank sensitive to valuation interest risk when positive shifts in the yield curve lead
to a declining market value of equity. Thereby, we explicitly integrate one of the central
functions of financial intermediation, that of maturity transformation, into the model.
The model implies that the fees banks charge on loans and deposits depend on both
the macroeconomic risk of unexpected changes in interest rates and the bank-specific
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microeconomic exposure to this risk, i.e. the maturity gap, as well as expected holding
period returns from maturity transformation.
We test the model-implied hypotheses for the German commercial banking sector, a bank-
based financial system in which maturity transformation evolves as a consequence of
liquidity creation by financial intermediaries. Many of these, especially small and medium-
sized banks, manage interest risk on-balance, which makes the dataset suitable for our
analysis.
In contrast to earlier studies, we investigate — additionally to net interest income — the
interest income and expense margin separately. Our results show that all banks price
the macroeconomic risk of interest rate volatility. The microeconomic risk of the specific
on-balance duration gap is priced by the savings and cooperative banks in the net interest
income margin and these results are driven via loan pricing on the asset side. On the
liability side, we find that interest rate risk exposure is priced only by cooperative banks.
The fees of larger private commercial banks with access to capital markets, on the other
hand, are not sensitive to on-balance interest rate risk.
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Appendix A
Lerner indices
A single-product Lerner index is defined as the output price minus marginal cost divided
by price, and equals the inverse of elasticity of demand for the output:
i∗TA −mc TA
i∗TA
= 1
N TA (i∗TA)
, (A.0.1)
where mc TA are marginal costs encompassing financial expenses.  TA represents the
elasticity of output demand in a market encompassing N banks. The output price i (the
interest rate that the bank charges) is assumed to be exogenous and is proxied by interest
income / interest-earning assets. Marginal costs for overall market power are estimated
from a single-output (total assets, TA), three-input translog cost function. The input
prices comprise: (i) cost of labor w1, (ii) cost of physical capital w2, (iii) and cost of
funding w3. The input prices have been proxied as: (i) w1 personnel cost / number of full-
time equivalent employees measured in 1,000; (ii) w2 operating cost excluding personnel
cost / fixed assets; (iii) w3 interest expenses paid / total interest-paying liabilities. Equity
Eq is included as a netput and a time trend Tr, specified as time dummies, captures
technical change. The translog cost function has the following form and is estimated
using fixed bank effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The usual symmetry and
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linear homogeneity in input price restrictions are imposed.
ln cit =γi + γA lnTAit +
1
2γAA (lnTAit)
2 +
3∑
h=1
γh lnwhit
+ 12
3∑
h=1
3∑
m=1
γhm lnwhit lnwmit +
3∑
h=1
γhA lnwhit lnTAit + γE lnEqit
+ 12γEE (lnEqit)
2 + γEA lnEqit lnTAit +
3∑
h=1
γhE lnwhit lnEqit
+ γT Tr +
1
2γTT (Tr)
2 + γTA Tr lnTAit
+
3∑
h=1
γTh Tr lnwhit + γTE Tr lnEqit + ln uit.
(A.0.2)
Marginal costs mc TAit are derived from
mcTAit =
[
γA + γAA lnTAit +
3∑
h=1
γhA lnwhit + γEA lnEqit + γTA Tr
] cit
TAit
. (A.0.3)
Separate Lerner indices for interest-bearing assets and liabilities are derived from first-
order conditions of profit maximization in the Monti-Klein model and expressed as (see
Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p. 58):
i∗L − i−mc L
i∗L
= 1
N L (i∗L)
; i− i
∗
D −mc D
i∗D
= 1
N D (i∗D)
(A.0.4)
where i L, i D and i are the interest rates set on loans, deposits and the interbank market,
respectively. To estimate the marginal cost, we follow the two-product output approach
of Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007). i L is proxied to equal interest income
/ interest-earning assets, and i D equals interest expenses / interest-paying liabilities.
The yearly average of the six-month LIBOR rate presents the interbank funding rate.
Marginal costs are estimated using a two-product output translog cost function, including
loans L and deposits D. Loans are proxied by interest-earning assets less bonds held and
deposits as total interest-paying liabilities less bonds issued.18 The interbank rate is clearly
18 It is assumed that bond supply and demand are perfectly elastic, that the bank cannot exercise
market power in trading bonds, and that bond portfolios are not associated with operating cost.
Statistically, bond portfolios have been excluded to make the loan and the deposit proxies less
correlated to each other. For the same reason, the impact of equity is not controlled for as equity
and interest-paying liabilities would otherwise almost total interest-earning assets.
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exogenous, and interest expenses on liabilities are now considered to be the output price
of deposits, so that we only include the two price input factors of labor (w1), and physical
capital (w2), which are defined in the same way as in the three-input cost function. Again
time dummies control for technical change, and fixed bank effects control for unobserved
heterogeneity. The translog cost function takes the following form:
ln cit =γi + γL lnLit +
1
2γLL (lnLit)
2 + γD lnDit +
1
2γDD (lnDit)
2
+ γLD lnLit lnDit +
2∑
h=1
γh lnwhit +
1
2
2∑
h=1
2∑
m=1
γhm lnwhit lnwmit
+
2∑
h=1
γhL lnwhit lnLit +
2∑
h=1
γhD lnwhit lnDit + γT Tr +
1
2γTT (Tr)
2
+ γTL Tr lnLit + γTD Tr lnDit +
2∑
h=1
γTh Tr lnwhit + ln uit.
(A.0.5)
The cost function has been estimated using fixed bank effects. Marginal cost are derived
from:
mc Lit =
[
γL + γLL lnLit + γLD lnDit +
2∑
h=1
γhL lnwhit + γTL Tr
] cit
Lit
mc Dit =
[
γD + γDD lnDit + γLD lnLit +
2∑
h=1
γhD lnwhit + γTD Tr
] cit
Dit
.
(A.0.6)
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Appendix B
Modified duration gaps
Table B.1 provides an overview of the different lender and borrower clienteles and the
time brackets reported in the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly balance sheet statistics. It
should be noted the brackets are filled according to the initial time to maturity.
To keep things simple, we make the following assumptions when calculating the modified
duration Dmod(M1,M2) for a specific position and maturity bracket with the boundaries
M1 andM2: (i) the initial time to maturity is equally distributed between the boundaries;
(ii) the bank has revolvingly invested the same amount in bonds with maturity M where
M1 < M < M2; (iii) all bonds are default-free and continuously pay par yield rf .
Table B.1: Initial maturities of lender and borrower clienteles
Position 1st bracket 2nd bracket 3rd bracket 4th bracket
Assets
Loans to banks daily ≤ 1 y. > 1 y. ≤ 5 y. > 5 y.
Loans to non-banks ≤ 1 y. > 1 y. ≤ 5 y. > 5 y.
Bonds held ≤ 1 y. > 1 y. ≤ 2 y. > 2 y.
Liabilities
Loans from banks daily ≤ 1 y. > 1 y. ≤ 2 y. > 2 y.
Loans from non-banks daily ≤ 1 y. > 1 y. ≤ 2 y. > 2 y.
Subordinated debt no maturity breakdown
Saving accounts ≤ 3 m. > 3 m.
Bonds issued ≤ 1 y. > 1 y. ≤ 2 y. > 2 y.
Maturity brackets reported in the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly balance sheet
statistics for different asset and liability classes.
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The modified duration of a continuously par-yield-paying, default-free bond of maturity
M is:
Dmod(M) =
1
rf
(1− exp(−rfM)) . (B.0.1)
The modified duration of a portfolio revolvingly investing in such bonds of maturity M ,
i.e. where the residual maturity is equally distributed within the interval [0,M ], can be
expressed as (see also the Appendix of Memmel, 2011):
Dmod(M) =
∫ M
t=0
1
M
Dmod(N)dN
= M − 1/rf (1− exp(−rfM))
Mrf
.
(B.0.2)
Finally, the modified duration of revolvingly investing in a portfolio of the aforementioned
type of bonds of a given maturity bracket from M1 to M2, with initial maturity being
equally distributed between the boundaries, is:
Dmod(M1,M2) =
1
M2 −M1
∫ M2
M1
Dmod(M)dM. (B.0.3)
Using first-order Taylor series approximations around rf = 0, equation (B.0.2) yields:
Dmod(M) ≈ 12M −
1
6M
2rf , (B.0.4)
and equation (B.0.3)
Dmod(M1,M2) ≈ 14 (M2 +M1)−
1
18
(
M22 +M21 +M2 ·M1
)
rf . (B.0.5)
The asset’s (liability’s) modified duration DAmod (DLmod) is calculated using equations
(B.0.4) and (B.0.5) employing weighted sums of all the brackets of assets (liabilities)
reported in Table B.1. The weights correspond to the proportion of assets (liabilities) in
a given bracket relative to total interest-bearing assets (liabilities). The modified duration
gap is derived as
Dgap = DAmod −DLmod
total interest-earning liabilities
total interest-paying assets . (B.0.6)
When no upper boundary for a maturity bracket is reported, it is assumed to be 8 years.
For saving accounts, applying legal maturities of 3 and 6 months would clearly overesti-
mate the duration gap. Therefore, we assume 50% of the volume to be core deposits with
long-term maturities of 9.5 and 10 years (depending on the legal maturity), and the other
half is assigned its legal maturity (see also Purnanandam, 2007).
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Appendix C
Revolving portfolios
The strategy of revolving portfolios is illustrated using an example. Imagine a bank that
grants solely risk-free loans of five years maturity. Whenever a loan becomes due, a
new loan with five years of maturity is granted. Under the assumption of time-invariant
business, the residual maturity of the bonds in the bank’s portfolio is equally distributed
between zero and five years. Memmel (2008) shows that this bank’s interest income
margin is equal to the five-year moving average of five-year risk-free par-yield bonds. For
balance sheet positions with a predetermined repricing period (like loans), the calculation
is relatively straight-forward. For other positions, we chose the following assumptions:
• When no upper boundary for a maturity bracket is reported, it is assumed to be 8
years.
• Daily maturities are modeled using the 3-month government par yields in order to
reduce the volatility resulting from estimation errors in fitting the lower end of the
Svensson term structure.
• Savings deposits are modeled as 50% core deposits (see also Purnanandam, 2007).
Deposits with up to 3 month maturities are modeled as the equally weighted moving
average of the 3-month and 9.5-year par yields, deposits with longer maturities as
the 6-month and 10-year par yield. Modelling savings deposits as weighted sums of
moving averages of long and short-term interest rates is a methodology consistent
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with the internal IRR management approaches of smaller German banks (see also
Memmel, 2011).
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Chapter 4
Market Timing, Maturity Mismatch,
and Risk Management: Evidence
from the Banking Industry*
Abstract
We investigate financial intermediaries’ interest rate risk management as the si-
multaneous decision to manage on-balance-sheet exposure and to use interest rate
swaps. Both decisions are substitute risk management strategies. For banks with
trading activity, the maturity gap and the decision to use interest rate swaps are
exogenous to one another. For banks without trading activity, the decision to use
interest rate swaps is exogenous to the maturity gap, but the reverse relationship
is endogenous. The magnitude of the maturity mismatch is, however, always an
endogenous determinant of the extent of derivatives use. These findings provide
support for the maturity gap being largely determined by customer liquidity needs,
whereas the decision to use interest rate swaps relies on compliance with interest
rate risk regulation. Exploiting the time-series variation in panel data, we find se-
lective hedging behavior in the use of interest rate swaps driven by the slope of the
yield curve as well as by funding uncertainty.
* This chapter is based on the working paper Market Timing, Maturity Mismatch, and Risk Manage-
ment: Evidence from the Banking Industry by Ruprecht et al. (2013).
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4.1 Introduction
Through their function as qualitative asset transformers, financial intermediaries are ex-
posed to non-diversifiable risks, specifically liquidity and interest rate risk. Financial
intermediation theory has derived models that explain the management and allocation
of these risks. Among the seminal studies explicitly related to interest rate risk (IRR),
Diamond (1984) stresses that banks should focus on managing credit risk for which they
possess a monitoring advantage, and hedge all IRR. Hellwig (1994) suggests that banks
allocate IRR to their depositors by offering contracts that do not necessarily repay de-
posits at par, thereby focusing on the liquidity risk of deposit withdrawal. Froot and
Stein (1998) propose that banks hedge all risks that can be sold to the capital market at
fair conditions, especially interest rate and currency risks.
However, empirical evidence contradicts financial intermediation theory to a large extent,
as we observe a large fraction of smaller banks, in particular, that do not use any off-
balance-sheet (OBS) IRR derivatives. Therefore, the question arises as to what determines
banks’ risk management decisions. As risks cannot be hedged only by means of OBS
derivatives, but also by adjusting on-balance-sheet operating policies (e.g., Purnanandam,
2007; Hankins, 2011), banks that manage risk solely on-balance may simply pursue more
conservative business strategies.
The most obvious reason for banks to keep IRR on the balance sheet instead of hedging
it — for example, by using interest rate swaps — is the profitability of maturity or term
transformation, which we will use interchangeably. A steep normally shaped yield curve
increases profits when a bank operates with a positive maturity mismatch, i.e. its assets
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have longer maturities and reprice less frequently than its liabilities.19 However, these
profits are associated with the risk that a rise in the yield curve, especially at the lower
maturity rates, may generate losses as in the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s
and early 1990s in the U.S. Moreover, the close alignment of interest and liquidity risk
through the maturity mismatch can threaten banks’ existence when they rely too heavily
on short-term wholesale funding, as the 2007-2008 financial crisis showed quite plainly.
One central determinant of the decision to manage risk on the balance sheet or off it is
the financial environment in which a bank operates. Allen and Santomero (2001) stress
that banks’ risk management techniques will differ between market-based and bank-based
financial systems as a result of the degree of competition financial intermediaries face
from financial markets. In bank-based economies, like Germany, financial intermediaries
apply intertemporal smoothing of non-diversifiable risks through the accumulation of
liquid reserves. In market-based economies, households will withdraw their funds when
banks build up liquidity reserves. Financial intermediaries need different, cross-sectional
risk management strategies to shield themselves and households’ portfolios against the
aforementioned risks (Allen and Gale, 1997). Increasingly popular cross-sectional risk
sharing encompasses derivatives hedging.
In spite of banks’ importance as suppliers of external capital and the IRR related to
their activities, the literature on banks’ IRR management is relatively scarce, whereas the
majority of risk management literature focuses on corporate hedging decisions, mainly
19 Memmel (2011) estimates the income from term transformation generated by German savings and
cooperative banks over the business cycle to be around 30 basis points annually, which is a significant
share of their overall interest income.
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commodity price hedging. Among the few exemptions, Schrand and Unal (1998) examine
thrifts’ overall risk management and find — in line with the models of Diamond (1984)
and Froot and Stein (1998) — a shift from interest rate risk towards credit risk following
thrift conversion. These authors suggest that risk management is a mean of allocating
risks from homogeneous risk sources, such as IRR, to core-business risks, where the bank
possesses a comparative information advantage.
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that hedging reduces cash flow variability and consequently
diminishes bankruptcy risk. Froot et al. (1993) endogenize the cost of financial distress
by assuming external capital to be more expensive than internally generated funds. In
support of these models, Brewer et al. (1996) show that hedging IRR reduces the cost
of uninsured debt, i.e. rates paid on commercial paper issued by thrifts. Purnanandam
(2007) simultaneously investigates the use of derivatives for hedging purposes and on-
balance-sheet IRR management of the duration gap for U.S. commercial banks. He finds
that banks intensify IRR management in response to increasing default risk. Additionally,
the use of interest rate derivatives makes banks less vulnerable to monetary shocks and
allows them to change the composition of their portfolios less drastically. Memmel and
Schertler (2011) show for the same sample of German commercial banks we also investigate
that net interest income is more heavily affected by changes in the yield curve than by
changes in the composition of asset and liability portfolios. Banks that use IRR derivatives
are less vulnerable to interest rate shocks, and hence derivatives are mainly employed for
hedging purposes. However, when the yield curve steepens derivative users increase their
maturity mismatch more significantly.
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Bolton et al. (2013) present a dynamic risk management model where bankruptcy risk
increases the risk of not having sufficient funds for value-adding investment projects, thus
increasing the incentives to hedge. However, for financially constrained firms it is optimal
not to hedge as margin requirements override cash flow volatility concerns. Moreover, their
model shows that market timing behavior can be rational in terms of ensuring sufficient
funding sources.20
Market timing of risk management activities has received increasing attention in financial
research. Stulz (1996) defines selective hedging as managers incorporating market views
into the timing of risk management activities, and considers this a mild form of speculation.
Empirical and survey evidence from non-financial firms suggests that timing derivatives
markets is done quite frequently. Such strategies should, however, result in permanent
additional profits only if managers have an information advantage, but sum up to zero if
not.
The main drivers of selective IRR risk management when entering into new debt con-
tracts or interest rate derivatives are the level and, especially, the slope of the yield curve.
Faulkender (2005) finds that firms alter the IRR exposure of new debt issues from fixed to
floating by jointly entering into interest rate swaps when the yield curve is steep. Vickery
(2008) confirms these results for small bank-dependent firms that choose between fixed-
rate and variable-rate loans. Credit constrained firms, however, are more likely to choose
fixed-rate interest per se. Recently, Mian and Santos (2012) have found evidence of active
maturity management driven by liquidity considerations. Credit-worthy firms tend to
20 The model of Bolton et al. (2013), however, incorporates equity market timing through the issuance
of new shares, and not debt market or derivatives market timing.
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renegotiate and extend loan maturity early during periods of good financial conditions.
The behavior of bank-dependent borrowers should have a directly observable effect on
banks’ balance sheets and might trigger changes in their OBS risk management. Besides
selective hedging, corporate use of interest rate derivatives also reveals speculation on
interest movements. Géczy et al. (2007) and Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) find evi-
dence that financially unconstrained firms incorporate market views into their derivatives
positions and use interest rate swaps, at least partly, for speculative purposes, too.
We investigate German commercial banks’ IRR management between 2000 and 2011 by
simultaneously estimating their maturity mismatch and interest rate swap activities. Our
empirical approach combines the simultaneous risk management framework of Purnanan-
dam (2007) with the cross-sectional and time-series regression models of Chernenko and
Faulkender (2011) to distinguish the use of interest rate swaps for hedging and speculative
purposes in panel data. On-balance-sheet IRR management and the use of interest rate
swaps are substitutes for one another in pursuit of the goal of keeping the overall IRR
exposure below regulatory thresholds. This confirms the results recently found by Hank-
ins (2011) that operative and financial hedging are substitutes in an attempt to manage
banks’ overall risk exposure. We also give evidence of hedging theories which predict that
the cost of bankruptcy makes firms pursue more conservative risk management. Selective
market timing behavior is observed for the maturity mismatch, the decision to use interest
rate swaps and the extent of their use with regard to the slope of the yield curve and
interbank funding uncertainty. The profitability of a steep yield curve induces commer-
cial banks to simultaneously increase their duration gap and to hold fewer interest rate
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swaps for hedging purposes, while the opposite holds for increasing funding uncertainty
as measured by a spread of the LIBOR over the government bond yield.
In all risk management equations, we use two exogenous instruments for the endogenous
variables in the simultaneous equations framework. We prove the instruments’ relevance
and validity not only to justify inference in the risk management regressions but also for
the proper use of Hausman-type tests on the exogeneity of the instrumented variables
(Hahn et al., 2011). These tests give evidence that, for banks with a trading book, both
the maturity gap and the decision to use interest rate swaps are exogenous to one another.
For banks without a trading book, the decision to hedge is exogenous to the maturity gap,
but the reverse relationship is endogenous. Only in samples of banks that use interest
rate swaps for the first time are these variables both endogenous to one another. On the
other hand, the maturity gap is always an endogenous driver of the extent of banks’ swap
holdings. These results clearly reflect the impact IRR regulation has on bank behavior.
Banks with too high an IRR exposure after netting out the OBS effects are considered
“outlier” banks that can expect supervisory scrutiny and even additional capital charges.
Hence, once the on-balance-sheet IRR exposure becomes too large, a bank has to look for
ways to decrease the overall exposure and will likely do so using interest rate swaps. Only
in these circumstances, the maturity gap and the decision to hedge are endogenous to one
another. Before a bank reaches the critical threshold for on-balance-sheet exposure or
once it has set up a derivative risk management department, the decision to use interest
rate swaps is exogenous. As banks that have a comparatively large duration gap are those
that decide to use interest rate swaps, the duration gap is an endogenous driver of the
volume of swaps held. This implies that banks manage their overall exposure to comply
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with the IRR regulation, whereas the maturity gap is determined by the liquidity needs
of bank-dependent borrowers and depositors.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the empirical research strategy
and puts emphasis on the instruments used to identify the system of equations in the
IRR framework. Data and summary statistics are presented in Section 4.3, before we
proceed with the empirical analysis. Section 4.4 introduces the hazard rate model which
is estimated in order to derive proxies for the cost of default in the risk management
analysis. Section 4.5 presents the results for the simultaneous equations of the IRR
management decisions, i.e. the on-balance-sheet exposure measured as the duration gap,
the decision to use swaps and the extent of interest rate swap use. Whenever possible,
regressions are run both cross-sectional and based on time-series estimators. The paper
ends with concluding remarks in Section 4.6.
4.2 Research Design
4.2.1 Regressions and Variables
Following Purnanandam (2007), we estimate both the maturity mismatch and the swap
use decision simultaneously in a system of equations. In line with most of the risk man-
agement literature, we estimate a Cragg (1971) model and separate the decision to hedge
from the extent of derivative use (e.g., Purnanandam, 2007; Zhu, 2012). The decision to
hedge corresponds to a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a given bank reports
a non-zero volume of interest rate swaps outstanding. The degree of hedging is modeled
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as the natural logarithm of the nominal volume of interest rate swaps outstanding to
total assets. To control for the potential sample selection bias arising from taking the
logarithm of the nominal swap volume, we include the inverse Mills ratio. The modified
duration gap is modeled using information available to the banking supervisors on dif-
ferent brackets of remaining time to maturity for classes of assets and liabilities and the
interest rate sensitivities from the standard approach for IRR regulation of the German
banking supervisory authority BaFin. See Appendix E, for more details of the modified
duration gap.
We exploit both the cross-sectional and the time-series variation in panel data ranging
from 2000-2011. Cross-sectional variation in linear models is captured applying both
between effects and Fama-MacBeth estimators. The results are then compared with
pooled OLS models to evaluate the impact of potential bias. Time-series variation is
investigated applying the within transformation of a fixed effects estimator. Just for
models of the decision to use swaps, we apply pooled probit regressions only in order not
to lose observations on banks that never hedge or, alternatively, hedge during the whole
sample period.
The use of cross-sectional as well as time-series estimators for IRR management decisions,
such as the on-balance-sheet exposure and the extent of interest rate swap, is related to
the empirical approach of Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) who examine non-financial
firms’ interest rate swap use. One of the key elements of interpreting the coefficients is
that these firms are assumed to have a constant exposure to IRR over time. When firms
manage towards a target fixed-to-floating IRR exposure, average hedge ratios should be
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explained by between effects and Fama-MacBeth models. In contrast, deviations from a
target hedge ratio over time can be regarded as market views on IRR drivers incorporated
into the hedging decision. Such market timing is then captured by fixed effects estimators.
Although the assumption of a constant IRR exposure over time is doubtful for banks,
there is nevertheless evidence that banks focusing on providing financial intermediation
services to local market retail customers have a comparably stable on-balance-sheet expo-
sure. In Germany, especially the smaller, locally operating savings and cooperative banks
have stable, homogeneous business models with a focus on granting loans and accept-
ing deposits. Under the assumptions that a bank’s on-balance-sheet maturity structure
remains stable through replacement of maturing assets and liabilities with new business
of the same initial maturity, and that business volumes have been generated in a way
which is equally distributed over time, a bank’s interest income and expenses can be
modeled using portfolios of revolving investments in par-yield paying bonds.21 Memmel
(2008) and Entrop et al. (2012) apply this approach empirically to German commercial
banks’ interest income and expenses since 1998 and can explain most of the variation
in these, especially for the smaller banks, giving support to the empirical validity of the
assumptions.22 The results of Memmel and Schertler (2011) give further support that the
on-balance-sheet exposure is comparatively stable among German banks.
These small commercial banks are also more likely not to engage in trading activities, and
fee income is a less important source of profitability. Most of them only have a banking
21 See Memmel (2008) for a detailed introduction to this approach.
22 A very simplified approach using revolving portfolios is even able to capture the general time-
series dynamics of German banks’ overall interest exposure, after netting on- and off-balance-sheet
positions (Memmel, 2011).
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book and no trading book. Pure banking book institutions are not only more likely to
have a stable on-balance-sheet exposure but are also prohibited from using OBS interest
rate instruments for speculation purposes to a substantial extent.23
In analyzing only pure banking book institutions, we thus have a similar setting to Cher-
nenko and Faulkender (2011). In order to examine the whole German banking sector,
we run regressions for the total sample, which consists of around 90% non-banking book
institutions, and on the sub-sample of trading book banks. The latter not only have more
exposure to market risk, they may also use interest rate swaps for speculation which goes
beyond the market timing of risk management activities. Empirically, trading revenues
are often found to be the riskier source of income (e.g., Stiroh, 2004) and establishing a
trading book might result in risk shifting from traditional relationship banking to trading
(Boot and Ratnovski, 2012).
In our empirical study, we investigate the impact of on-balance-sheet IRR, captured in
the modified duration gap, on the decision to use interest rate swaps and vice versa,
and therefore estimate our model as a system of three simultaneous equations. The
third equation analyzes the extent of swap use and includes the duration gap as an
explanatory variable. Our bank-specific explanatory variables are consistent with those
used in the study by Purnanandam (2007). As corporate risk management theory stresses
the importance of the cost of bankruptcy for risk taking, hedging and speculation behavior,
23 The German Banking Act (KWG) defines banks as trading book institutions when they have on
average (in a single year) either trading activities of more than 5% (6%) in relation to both total
assets and off-balance-sheet activities, or of more than e15 (20) million in absolute terms. These
volumes are minor compared to the total assets of commercial banks in Germany, even of the small
cooperative banks. See Table 4.2 for details.
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we include the natural logarithm of the Probability of default (PD) derived from a hazard
rate model to proxy for this determinant. Size, measured as the logarithm of total assets,
is included to proxy for economies of scale in setting up a derivatives department. Larger
banks are more likely to have a risk management department that is proficient enough
to deal with derivatives. At the same time, larger banks are also more likely to have
other income sources apart from interest income and might, as a result, not depend
to the same extent on income from term transformation. Based on Froot et al. (1993)
banks with more investment opportunities should be more likely to decrease IRR, both on
balance sheet and off balance sheet. Investment opportunities are proxied in line with the
banking literature (e.g., Froot and Stein, 1998) as the (annual) Total asset growth rate.
As current risk management literature stresses the importance of liquidity management
considerations, we include two measures which capture liquidity on the asset and liability
side, Liquid assets, the sum of cash reserves and securities which can be sold within one
year, and the ratio of Savings deposits to total assets as a measure of funding strength.
In addition to Purnanandam, we include a Branch HHI, a Herfindahl (-Hirschman) index
of branch concentration at the county level, as a measure of bank competition. Most
of the savings banks and cooperative banks, and, therefore, the majority of banks in
our sample, are limited to running branches in their municipality, which is referred to
as the regional principle. We therefore consider the county level the relevant market to
measure banking concentration, although merger activity has now created some savings
banks and cooperative banks with a territory exceeding a single county and even though
private banks were never limited to the regional principle. The model derived by Adam
et al. (2007) predicts that competition has a direct impact on the decision to hedge risks
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in equilibrium. Furthermore, competition may have an effect on the maturity mismatch
choice via its nexus with risk taking. When we investigate the total sample, we also
include a dummy that takes the value of 1 for banks with a trading book, and we include
banking group dummies (savings, cooperative and private commercial banks) to control
for different business models in the cross-sectional settings. Time-series models of the
maturity gap and the extent of interest rate swap use as well as the pooled probit models
of the decision to use interest rate swaps also include macroeconomic variables to test for
market timing behavior in IRR management. These include the slope of the yield curve
(e.g., Faulkender, 2005; Vickery, 2008) and a variable we refer to as LIBOR spread, the
difference between the 12-month LIBOR and the German government bond yield. The
latter is intended to capture the effects of the TED spread used in U.S. banking studies and
proxies for interbank funding uncertainty. We also interact both of the aforementioned
macroeconomic variables with the 1-year government bond yield to analyze differing effects
of banks’ risk taking behavior in response to the monetary environment (Borio and Zhu,
2012).24
When analyzing banks’ internally calculated overall IRR exposure after netting on and off-
balance-sheet exposures, Memmel (2011) finds that regulatory screening and time effects
only explain a minor share in the variation of IRR exposure. The majority of variation is
due to bank-specific, idiosyncratic effects. With our regression setting, we not only shed
light on the drivers of these idiosyncratic effects, but also distinguish between their effects
on on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet risk management.
24 For an overview of the variables used in the empirical study, including those in the hazard rate
model, see Appendix D.
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4.2.2 Identification Strategy: Exclusion Restrictions
We expect the maturity mismatch and the decisions to use interest rate swaps and the
extent of their use to be jointly determined as banks manage their overall IRR exposure.
The strict exogeneity assumption of an OLS estimator is then violated and the derived
coefficients are biased. A strategy to overcome this violation is an instrumental variable
(IV) estimation. Valid IVs are only allowed to influence one of the two risk management
decisions, either the on-balance-sheet or the off-balance-sheet decision, but not to have
a direct impact on the other decision, which is referred to as the exclusion restriction.
Having more than one IV for each endogenous variable, we can statistically test validity
via an overidentification test. With strong as well as valid instruments at hand, we test
the endogeneity assumed in the simultaneous equation framework, using a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman type specification test (Hahn et al., 2011).
We will use the following instruments in the risk management equations. For the duration
gap, we propose the use of the share of Customer loans in relation to total assets and
Loan commitments to total assets. For the decision to use interest rate swaps and their
extent we include Past swap experience as a dummy variable that is 1 when a bank has
once used a swap, both interest and/or currency swaps, since 1998. We additionally use
Average board experience, as the average experience of all board members in relevant
executive management positions measured in years, as an instrument for the decision
to use interest rate swaps but not for their extent. This allows us to correct for the
sample selection bias by adding the inverse Mills ratio into the extent of interest rate
swap regressions. Furthermore, we include an exogenous instrument with regard to the
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risk management decisions in the estimation of the hazard rate model. Here, we choose
Hidden liabilities, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a bank avoids writing
off assets by making use of an accounting option. Below, we justify the use of these
specific IVs.
Instruments to identify the probability of default:
Risk management theory postulates that the cost of bankruptcy and the resulting financial
constraints are an endogenous determinant of risk management decisions. Although the
variables we use in the hazard rate model are not identical to those in the risk management
analysis, many of the variables that explain a bank’s default are also drivers of its risk
management decisions. Hence, these variables do not qualify as IVs.
In order for the PD derived from the hazard rate model to be an exogenous determinant of
the IRR management decisions, at least one explanatory variable must not have a direct
influence on the magnitude of the duration gap, the decision to use swaps, and the extent
of their use. We argue that avoiding write-offs on assets,25 — creating so called Hidden
liabilities — satisfies the exclusion restriction. This accounting option in the German
GAAP — (the commercial code, HGB) — is often used as a form of “window dressing”
for accounting statements by postponing realized losses into the future.
Biddle et al. (2012a) observe that accounting conservatism26 reduces subsequent corpo-
rate bankruptcy risk through restricted earnings management and higher cash reserves.
Moreover, Biddle et al. (2012b) find that accounting conservatism directly reduces distress
25 Write-offs can be avoided by assigning and reclassifying certain kinds of securities to the banking
book, where they are accounted for at historical cost instead of their lower market value.
26 Accounting conservatism is considered to be a prudent reaction to risk and uncertainty and their
adequate disclosure in accounting statements.
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likelihood by reducing operating cash flow downside risk, consistent with the theoretical
model of Froot et al. (1993). It has an additional indirect effect through higher cash hold-
ings. Distinguishing between conditional and unconditional conservatism,27 it is found
that conditional accounting conservatism serves as a complementary strategy, whereas
unconditional accounting conservatism serves as a substitute strategy for traditional risk
management, such as cash management, operative and derivatives hedging. Avoiding
hidden liabilities and thereby realizing losses on securities held in a more timely manner
is a form of conservative accounting. After controlling for the indirect effect accounting
conservatism has on cash holdings, by controlling for liquid assets in the risk management
decisions, there should be no effect of hidden liabilities other than through operating cash
flow downside risk which is captured in our measures of the distress likelihood.
Instruments to identify the maturity gap equation:
The maturity gap, especially for the small, savings and cooperative banks, is driven by
the demand for long maturity liquidity on the asset side and the supply of short-term
deposits on the liability side. In contrast, interbank loans are used by the smaller savings
and cooperative banks to reduce the on-balance-sheet exposure (Ehrmann and Worms,
2004). Instrument validity is given when the Customer loans have no direct effect on
interest rate swap use except through the (expected positive) effect on the magnitude on
the maturity gap.
We argue that the only effect Loan commitments have on interest rate swap usage is
through their on-balance-sheet effect on the maturity mismatch. This argument seems
27 Unconditional conservatism is the effect of accounting principles per se. Conditional conservatism
relates to more timely recognition of negative corporate outcomes.
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counterintuitive as the fixed-rate loan commitments prevailing in Germany inherit IRR
that can (partly) be hedged using derivatives. Additionally, as loan commitments are
OBS activities, they do not have a directly observable impact on the on-balance-sheet
IRR.
Besides econometric evidence from overidentification tests, we give further evidence of
the exogeneity of loan commitments by drawing on the literature. Although our duration
gap proxy captures the bank’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates, the measure is also
closely related to a bank’s liquidity risk exposure. Kashyap et al. (2002) derive a model
in which banks possess a natural hedge against liquidity risk via imperfectly correlated
draw-down risk for loan commitments and withdrawal risk for deposits. Carrying out
both lending and deposit activities offers banks synergies in using the buffer stock of
liquid assets.
Berrospide et al. (2012) investigate corporate use of credit lines and find that U.S. firms
that hedge the IRR from variable-rate loan commitments using interest rate swaps may
draw on their credit lines more heavily. The liquidity risk in loan commitments seems to
be considered more important compared to the IRR. It should be noted that floating-rate
loan commitments — as typically offered in the U.S. — expose borrowers to IRR, whereas
fixed-rate commitments — as prevailing in Germany — expose the financial intermediary.
A further link between loan commitments and the maturity of loans is put forward by
Berger et al. (2005), who find that corporates that draw loans under commitment re-
ceive loans with no different maturity if they are high-risk firms. On the other hand,
high-risk corporates that do not draw under commitment receive only loans with signif-
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icantly lower maturity. Loan commitments, especially (revolving) lines of credit, are a
means of acquiring soft information on borrowers out of relationship lending28 and pro-
vide monitored liquidity insurance that prevents borrowers’ illiquidity seeking (Acharya
et al., 2012). Therefore, undrawn loan commitments can already have a direct effect on
the existing maturity gap via the information collected from relationship lending and via
intensified monitoring upon frequent renewal.
We do not claim that fixed-rate loan commitments do not carry any IRR that can be
hedged using interest rate swaps, but argue that liquidity risk is the prevailing risk in
loan commitments. After controlling for asset and funding liquidity, loan commitments
should not have any influence on either the decision to use swaps or the extent of their
use; however they still have an effect on the maturity mismatch.
Instruments to identify the swap use decision and the extent of their use equations:
The Past swap experience dummy serves as a proxy for the existence of a derivatives
risk management department or experience in handling interest rate derivatives. Chen
(2011) uses a similar instrument; specifically, the past experience of fund managers as
an IV for the current use of derivatives by the hedge funds they manage. Purnanandam
(2007) uses a cross-sectional hedging experience dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
bank holds derivatives for purposes other than IRR management during the same period.
Unfortunately, in our sample too few banks use currency swaps to create IVs that pass
the weak identification test.29
28 See, for example, Berger and Udell (1995); Jiménez et al. (2009); Norden and Weber (2010), and
specifically for German banks screening for bankruptcy risk, Davydenko and Franks (2008).
29 We run robustness checks, not reported for brevity, that contain information on whether the bank
uses any kind of derivatives to hedge or speculate on currency or market risk. Unfortunately, data is
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One potential concern with a dummy based on past hedging experience is that previous
years’ interest rate swap use predetermines contemporaneous use. This would be the
case if a bank buys swaps with maturities of more than one year and holds them until
maturity. We do not see a problem in using past swap use for the following reasons. First,
about 10% of the banks in our sample that used swaps in an earlier year, do not do so
the year after. Therefore, swap experience does not perfectly predict current swap use
and some banks change frequently between years where they use swaps and years where
they do not. Even if banks engage in swaps with maturities of more than one year, it
is possible for them to close these positions. Second, Gorton and Rosen (1995) report
that a substantial share of interest rate swaps held by banks have maturities of less than
one year for reasons of regulatory capital charges on counterparty risk. Moreover, during
the past decade, there has been a substantial increase in short-term maturity overnight
index swaps (OIS) to hedge interbank rates. Current figures presented by Fleming et al.
(2012) support these statements. Although 10-year and 30-year interest rate swaps are
still frequently traded tenors for hedging the IRR from long-term loans, the vast majority
of all interest rate derivatives have maturities of less than one-year.
Our second instrument is based on the finding that characteristics of board members have
an impact on hedging decisions, but not on the extent of hedging (e.g., Zhu, 2011, 2012).
Therefore, we include the average experience of all board members in bank executive
available only until 2008. The coefficients derived are very similar to those reported when employing
the Past swap experience and overidentification tests are also insignificant for all samples investigated.
However, the weak instrument statistics are significantly lower, and although they are still above the
values suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005), the coefficients for the instrumented Dummy interest
rate swap use cannot be distinguished from zero.
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positions measured in years as an explanatory variable for the decision to use swaps.
As this variable does not influence the extent of hedging, we can use it additionally to
estimate the Inverse Mills ratio in a sample selection model and do not simply identify the
selection model from the non-linearity of a probit estimator. Average board experience
therefore qualifies the exclusion restrictions for both the maturity gap and the extent
of swap use decision and only has a direct impact on the decision to use interest rate
swaps. Zhu (2011) uses a dummy based on whether the CEO is below the age of 45 as
a variable identifying the decision to hedge, but not the extent thereof.30 We argue that
board experience has no other influence on the maturity gap decision apart from the effect
through the use of interest rate derivatives, as the maturity gap for most banks is largely
determined by borrower and depositor liquidity needs.
In summary, we estimate the following system of equations:
DG =αDG + βDG1SU + βDG2CL+ βDG3LC + βDG4X + DG
SU =αSU + βSU1DG+ βSU2PSE + βSU3BExp+ βSU4X + SU
SE =αSE + βSE1DG+ βSE2PSE + βSE3IMR + βSE4X + SE,
(4.2.1)
where, for simplicity subscripts indicating bank or time units are left out. DG stands
for the (modified) duration gap, SU for a dummy of the swap use decision, and SE
represents the extent of interest rate swap use, proxied as the logarithm of the nominal
volume of interest rate swaps in relation to total assets. CL is customer loans, and LC
loan commitments. PSE is the dummy of past interest rate swap experience, and BExp
30 For the smaller German savings banks and cooperative banks, it is not possible to identify the CEO
or the CFO of a bank as these banks do not distinguish between different board responsibilities.
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the average board experience, while IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio controlling for sample
selection in the extent of interest rate swap use. X is a vector of all exogenous explanatory
variables that influence all risk management decisions.
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Data
We use data from 2000-2011 in our simultaneous risk management framework. The start
date of the analysis is due to the availability of data for the variable Liquid assets. For the
hazard rate model we employ data starting in 1994 to make use of as many default events
as possible, especially restructuring mergers during the wave of consolidation, the German
banking sector underwent in the 1990s. To create the instrument Past swap experience,
we use information dating back to 1998. All data is provided by the prudential banking
supervision databases of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The data is taken from the P&L and
balance sheet statements, the auditor’s report, year end values of the monthly balance
sheet statistics, and liquidity reporting. Macroeconomic data is identical to that available
on the Bundesbank’s website. Board experience is taken from a supervisory database
on characteristics of bank managers in executive positions, as the appointment to such a
position has to be approved by the German banking supervisory authority BaFin. Default
data comes from a database on regulatory interventions.
We windsorize our variables at the 99th percentile and at the 1st percentile, except for
Size and (the logarithm of) the Probability of default estimated in the hazard rate model.
The impact of mergers on the consistency of accounting measures is accounted for by
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creating a new “artificial” banking entity after every merger taking place. This is the
most frequently applied approach when using Bundesbank data. When we create the
Past swap experience dummy, the variable takes the value of 1 for the new entity if at
least one of the two pre-merger institutions used any kind of swaps before the merger.
As our variable is intended to proxy for the existence of a derivatives risk management
department, this procedure seems justified as the knowledge of how to hedge risks off the
balance sheet is unlikely to be lost during a merger process.
Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 displays the distribution of banks using interest rate swaps over the sample
period from 2000-2011. Although the absolute number of banks reporting interest rate
swap use increases only slightly from 640 to 678, their relative share increases heavily from
29.95% in 2000 to 49.16% in 2011. This effect is due to the consolidation of the German
banking sector that led to the disappearance of about 700 banks during the sample period.
The relative increase in the use of interest rate swaps was quite sharp between 2000 and
2007, but slowed thereafter. A clear relation between a bank’s size and the use of interest
rate swaps is observable. Whereas in the lowest size quintile, less than 13% of banks hold
interest rate swaps, the percentage increases gradually and peaks at the highest quintile
at more than 83%.
Interestingly, the current share of interest rate swap users is close the 50%, which is
the solution of firms hedging in equilibrium in the Adam et al. (2007) model. These
authors also summarize many studies which find the percentage of non-financial firms
in several industries and indices to be close to this value. As the banking sector is a
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Swap Users over Time
Size Quintiles
Year Total no. banks No. Swap Users in % 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
2000 2,048 640 29.25 10.82 27.97 41.13 45.57 66.54
2001 1,902 601 29.07 7.74 26.20 39.35 45.75 70.61
2002 1,784 572 29.60 6.54 25.32 37.60 47.04 71.28
2003 1,659 546 31.28 7.69 25.63 39.15 47.26 72.08
2004 1,646 595 34.99 8.21 29.08 39.08 50.46 73.01
2005 1,597 593 36.13 8.26 28.21 38.42 55.35 75.00
2006 1,579 682 42.37 8.79 35.90 45.60 59.56 77.78
2007 1,548 715 45.87 10.59 38.10 49.72 62.86 78.59
2008 1,494 702 46.92 10.44 33.62 50.71 62.96 80.24
2009 1,446 684 47.16 11.59 32.19 46.43 64.24 83.04
2010 1,442 685 47.30 12.14 30.29 46.42 60.26 82.18
2011 1,377 678 49.16 12.79 31.10 49.55 62.20 83.15
Total 19,522 7,693 38.28 10.02 29.31 42.63 53.39 75.69
This table presents descriptive statistics on 19,522 bank-year observations of German commercial banks between
2000-2011. Size quintiles are based on total assets in 2011, where the 1st quintile encompasses the smallest and
the 5th the largest banks. Swap users are defined according to a positive nominal volume of interest rate swaps
at the end of a given calendar year. This table encompasses all commercial banks and is not limited to the data
requirements of the samples used for the regression analysis.
regulated industry with supervision of risk management, this result should, however, not
be mistaken for the industry equilibrium percentage of hedging firms in the model cited
above.
Surprisingly, we find a significantly larger percentage of banks that manage IRR off the
balance sheet in our study compared to Purnanandam (2007), although the theory of
intertemporal smoothing would have predicted the opposite (Allen and Santomero, 2001).
In our sample, 31.28% of commercial banks report interest rate swaps outstanding in
2003, whereas Purnanandam reports 5.94% users of interest rate derivatives for hedging
purposes for his U.S. commercial bank sample in the third quarter of 2003.
We present summary statistics of the variables used in the risk management equations in
Table 4.2 separately for interest rate swap users and non-users, and test for differences in
means and medians between these two groups. Some noteworthy features appear: swap
users have a slightly higher modified duration gap, but the economic magnitude of the
difference is not too pronounced. The mean difference is only 0.14 percentage points,
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but significant at the 1% level. Moreover, swap users are larger in size with regard to
total assets and are more likely to have a trading book. They hold less liquid assets and
receive less funding from savings deposits, but nevertheless make more loan commitments.
Interestingly, the average board experience is significantly lower for banks that use swaps.
For most of the variables, the differences between users and non-users are significant at
the 1% level. One exception is the difference in the means of the probability of default,
which cannot be distinguished statistically.
German commercial banks indeed have comparatively large buffer stocks of liquid assets,
as predicted by the theory of intertemporal smoothing in Allen and Gale (1997). The
mean of liquid assets in relation to total assets is around 43.5% for swap users and 44.5%
for non-users, and the difference of 1 percentage point is economically not very large,
although statistically significant. Purnanandam (2007) reports non-users as having, on
average, 36% and users 30.5% liquid assets. Here, overall levels are smaller and the
difference between users and non-users of interest rate derivatives for hedging purposes
is more pronounced. It should, however, be borne in mind that the definitions of liquid
assets do not completely match.
4.4 Hazard Rate Model
Following Purnanandam (2007), we proxy for the cost of bankruptcy by estimating the
bank-specific probability of default (PD) from a hazard rate model.31 The hazard rate
31 This approach implicitly assumes identical loss given default (LDG) for banks when the PD is the
only relevant variable. Purnanandam (2007), however, finds no qualitatively different results when
proxying LGD instead of PD. Moreover, the model of Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) implies that
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model is estimated using default events from 1994 to 2011. As defaults appear on various
dates during a given year, all covariates are lagged values from the previous year-end.
Defaults for 2012 were not available at the start of this study. PDs for 2011 have there-
fore been predicted from the coefficients derived with covariates until 2010. We include
the following default indicator dummies as the dependent variable: forced closures and
restructuring mergers as well as capital injections by either sectoral insurance schemes or
the federal scheme set up during the recent financial crisis. The model is estimated using
a pooled multiperiod logit model (Shumway, 2001) with standard errors clustered at bank
level. A similar model is used in the banking supervision department of the Bundesbank
to gauge the financial soundness of national banks. The bank-specific covariates are based
on the CAMELS taxonomy and therefore include variables capturing Capital adequacy,
Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk.32
Specifically, we choose the following variables to estimate the PD: capital adequacy is
included using the Tier 1 capital ratio, the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
(RWA), and Total bank reserves, the ratio of total banks reserves that serve as equity, to
total assets (TA). The dummy Reserve reduction takes the value 1 if the aforementioned
reserves have been reduced. Asset quality is proxied using a Herfindahl (-Hirschman) in-
dex (HHI) of loan concentration over 23 industry sectors. Earnings are captured by ROE,
the return on equity, defined as operating income to equity. Additionally, the competitive
a bank’s PD, and not the LGD, is the major driver of a “maturity rat race” leading to excessively
short durations for banks’ liabilities.
32 Liquid asset measures are not included as an explanatory variable, which is the common procedure
in the “Bundesbank hazard rate model”. If included, such measures show up insignificant as liquidity
appears to be an indicator for the lack of business opportunities and not of active risk management
(Porath, 2006).
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environment is controlled for by the Branch HHI on the county level. Financial interme-
diation theory provides predictions for the nexus of risk taking and competition. Boyd
and De Nicoló (2005) show that the effect of competition on bank risk taking depends on
borrowers’ reaction on the transmission channel of market power into loan rates. More
concentrated banking markets can trigger less risk taking through rising charter values.
However, raising loan rates can also increase risk taking when the pool of borrowers is
more likely to default. Therefore, predictions on the coefficient of the Branch HHI cannot
be made. The level of the short-term interbank 3-month LIBOR rate and regional GDP
growth at the state level are included to control for changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment. Dummies for savings and cooperative banks capture heterogeneity in business
models with private commercial banks being the reference group left out.
The impact of these variables can be seen in Table 4.3 and is presented displaying marginal
effects from the logit model. As expected, Tier 1 capital and bank reserve endowments
reduce bankruptcy risk significantly, whereas the dummy indicating reserve reductions is
an indicator of significantly higher default likelihood. Specialization in certain business
sectors via concentrated loan portfolios does not significantly impact default likelihoods.
ROE significantly reduces bankruptcy risk through its effect on capital accumulation. A
higher value for the Branch HHI indicates more concentrated and, therefore, less compet-
itive banking markets. Our results thus indicate that competition in the banking market
slightly improves banking stability. Business conditions captured in local GDP growth
have no significant influence on bank default, but a lower level for short-term interbank
rates increases distress likelihood as predicted by the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy (Borio and Zhu, 2012). At first glance, this finding contradicts the effect that
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Table 4.3: Hazard Rate Model
Capital ratio -0.0382**
(0.016)
Total reserves -1.6612***
(0.138)
Dummy reserve reduction 0.6270***
(0.115)
HHI credit portfolios -0.0062
(0.005)
ROE -0.0451***
(0.004)
Branch HHI 0.0002**
(0.000)
3-month LIBOR -0.1416***
(0.045)
Regional GDP growth 0.0016
(0.012)
Dummy hidden liabilities 0.3521***
(0.108)
Dummy savings banks -0.6421***
(0.151)
Dummy private banks -0.8537***
(0.210)
Constant -2.2435***
(0.280)
Observations 40,661
Area under ROC curve 0.859
Pseudo R2 0.186
Cragg-Donald F -stat. Duration Gap Pooled 86.80
Cragg-Donald F -stat. Duration Gap FE 29.04
Cragg-Donald F -stat. Swap Use Pooled 26.78
Cragg-Donald F -stat. Swap Extent Pooled 34.22
Cragg-Donald F -stat. Swap Extent Time Series 11.08
Overidentification stat. [p-val.] Duration Gap Pooled 0.057 [0.811]
Overidentification stat. [p-val.] Duration Gap FE 0.073 [0.788]
Overidentification stat. [p-val.] Swap Use Pooled 2.058 [0.151]
Overidentification stat. [p-val.] Swap Extent Pooled 0.875 [0.350]
Overidentification stat. [p-val.] Swap Extent Time
Series
0.716 [0.397]
Dependent variable: distress event, including forced closures, restructuring mergers, and capital injections.
The model is estimated as a logit regression over the time period from 1994-2011. Coefficients are displayed
as marginal effects. All covariates are lagged from the previous year end. Standard errors are clustered
at bank level and displayed in parentheses. Significance at the 10%/5%/1% level is marked by */**/***.
Cragg-Donald F -statistics for weak identification and overidentification statistics are from the regressions
run in Section 4.5 when distress events are included instead of the probability of default and instrumented
using hidden liabilities. Overidentification is achieved using two instruments each for either the duration
gap or interest rate swap use. Cragg-Donald statistics, on the other hand, are the first stage F -statistics
when only the distress events are instrumented and are always carried out as linear probability models using
OLS (Angrist, 2001). The critical Stock and Yogo (2005) value for each of these regressions accounting
for clustered standard errors is 16.38. The regression for deriving the overidentification statistic with
the hedging decision as the dependent variable is a two-step IV-Probit regressions (Newey, 1987) and the
overidentification statistic is from Lee (1992). In all other regressions the overidentification test is a Hansen-
J test. The overidentification and Cragg-Donald F -statistics in the time-series swap extent regressions are
based on the setting proposed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010).
would have been attributed to funding conditions and experiences of the U.S. savings
and loan (S&L) crisis. However, contemporaneous studies confirm the positive relation of
short-term interest rates to banks’ risk-taking behavior (Jiménez et al., 2012).
We consider Hidden liabilities to be exogenous to the risk management decisions examined
in Section 4.5. The coefficient is positive as expected and significant with a t-statistic of
almost 3.3. Having hidden liabilities on the balance sheet increases the likelihood of default
during the following year by 35%, a change of high economic magnitude. Instrumenting
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actual defaults with the dummy for hidden liabilities in the risk management regressions
of Section 4.5 — using defaults as the only variable to be instrumented — we receive weak
instrument statistics, which are always above the critical value of 16.38 for the Cragg-
Donald F -test adjusted for clustered standard errors. The only exception is the time-series
regression of the extent of interest rate swap use, which is analyzed in a panel sample
selection setting of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). In this setting, the F -statistic falls
to 11.08, which is, however, still above the old rule of thumb that the F -statistic should
exceed 10. As indicated by the t-statistics, hidden liabilities are indeed a strong and
therefore relevant instrument. In further regressions, where both the actual default and
the decision to use swaps or the maturity gap are considered endogenous and therefore
instrumented, we can reject tests of overidentifying restrictions conveniently in all cases at
the 10% level. Overidentification is achieved using the two instruments for the decision to
use interest rate swaps or the maturity gap. As we are, however, interested in the impact
the latent variable Probability of default has on risk management decisions rather than the
actual default, we will not proceed using actual default in the following risk management
regressions.
The hazard rate model has both good predictive and discriminatory powers. Statistical
power is evaluated using the pseudo R2, which has a value of 0.189. Discriminatory power
is judged using the value of the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
Curve, which is 0.859. Both values are comparatively good considering the parsimonious
use of explanatory variables compared with other studies.
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Unlike in the U.S., the German banking industry did not undergo a major crisis with
its underlying causes in the dynamics of interest rates, like the S&L crisis that affected
thrifts in the U.S. during the 1980s. Although we find that defaulting banks were more
sensitive to a decrease in the level of interbank rates, we did not include specific variables
related to interest rate risk taking, and there thus exists no ex ante mechanical relation
between the PDs derived and IRR management.
4.5 Simultaneous Interest Rate Risk Management
Although we estimate the regressions for the (modified) maturity gap and the decision
to use interest rate swaps and their extent as a system of simultaneous equations, we
will present and discuss the results in different tables. For brevity, we do not display the
results of first-stage regressions as these regression tables are similar to the second-stage
results for the other risk management decision in the simultaneous equation framework.
We estimate the simultaneous equations framework as two-stage least squares (2-SLS)
regressions with standard errors generally clustered at the bank level.
The results presented in Table 4.4 show that the coefficients derived from pooled OLS
models, controlling with time dummies, are very close to those from Fama-MacBeth
regressions, when the swap use dummy is considered exogenous. This holds especially
for the total and the non-trading book samples. We therefore argue that pooled models
capture cross-sectional variation without too severe a bias. Fama-MacBeth regressions
derive the significance of coefficients solely from the time-series variation of coefficients
over distinct periods using Newey-West standard errors with automatic lag selection. This
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approach, however, would treat instruments created in the first stage as variables and not
as estimated instruments and standard errors would be underestimated. We will therefore
focus on 2-SLS pooled regressions together with between effects IV regressions when we
simultaneously investigate interest rate swap use and on-balance-sheet IRR management.
Another advantage is that we can then draw on the complete IV statistics available for
2-SLS regressions. Similarly, Table 4.5 compares between effects, Fama-MacBeth and
pooled OLS estimators for the extent of interest rate swap use regression models when
the modified duration gap is taken as exogenous. Again, pooled OLS gives quite similar
results to Fama-MacBeth. The best results are now achieved for the two sub-samples of
non-trading and trading book banks.
4.5.1 Maturity Gap
4.5.1.1 Cross-Sectional Variation
Table 4.6 presents the cross-sectional results of the maturity gap equation within the si-
multaneous risk management framework. As expected, the coefficients of the swap use
dummy are significantly positive, indicating that banks deciding to use interest rate swaps
are operating with a higher maturity mismatch. On average, commercial banks that use
swaps have a 0.16 percentage point higher modified duration gap. The effect is highest for
trading book institutions where the effect amounts to 0.65, or 0.48 percentage points, de-
pending on the estimated model, between effects or pooled OLS. The positive coefficients
give evidence that, although trading book institutions might use interest rate swaps for
the purpose of speculation, they predominantly seem to use them for the purpose of hedg-
92
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ing. This confirms previous results from Memmel and Schertler (2011) who demonstrate,
based on the effect of interest rate swap usage on the variability of net interest income,
that interest rate swaps are mainly used for hedging purposes.
The effect of the PD supports the predictions of theoretical risk management models,
such as Froot et al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998), that the potential distress cost
leads commercial banks to take less IRR. Again, this effect is most pronounced for trading
book institutions. As trading book institutions receive more of their funding from capital
markets and arms-length relationships in interbank markets, whereas the majority of pure
banking book institutions receive interbank loans from their associated head institutions
(Ehrmann and Worms, 2004), these results can be interpreted as the effect of risk taking
on the cost of external finance, as also found by Brewer et al. (1996).
Size leads pure banking book institutions to take more, but trading book institutions to
take less IRR on the balance sheet. Business opportunities show the expected negative
effect as predicted by Froot et al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) only for pure banking
book institutions. For trading book financial intermediaries the opposite holds, although
the coefficients are only significant in the pooled OLS setting. Asset and funding liquidity
both lead banks to engage in less maturity transformation. This finding is not surprising
for liquid assets as a substantial portion of these assets have short-term maturity that
reduces the modified duration gap. For savings deposits the finding is, however, surpris-
ing as the short-term funding nature of deposits leads to a higher duration gap per se.
On the other hand, many small regional banks with strong deposit funding lack business
opportunities and hold proportionally large liquidity buffers, often deposited via inter-
95
bank loans at their head institutions. The results of all coefficients presented so far are
consistent with those found by Purnanandam (2007) in cross-sectional regressions where
Fama-MacBeth estimators have been applied. More concentrated and therefore less com-
petitive markets lead to more on-balance-sheet interest rate risk taking — giving support
of the theory developed by Boyd and De Nicoló (2005).
The coefficients for Customer loans and Loan commitments are positive and significant
at the 1% level in all regressions. Banks with a higher share of customer loan volume
indeed have a higher duration gap as already documented by Ehrmann and Worms (2004).
The positive coefficient for the ratio of loan commitments confirms the results of Berger
et al. (2005) that banks use loan commitments to gather information on borrower quality
and finally to offer loans with longer maturity. The significance levels serve as upfront
indicators of instrument relevance in the swap use regressions presented in Section 4.5.2.
The first-stage instrumentation process of Interest rate swap use—which has been carried
out for simplicity as a linear probability model — proves instrument relevance as the test
statistics for weak instruments are always conveniently above the critical value of 19.93.33
The magnitude of the weak identification tests is largely driven by the variable Past swap
experience. Overidentification tests strengthen our arguments as to the exogeneity of the
instruments included. Interestingly, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics indicate that
the choice of using interest rate swaps is exogenous to the magnitude of the maturity gap.
Hence, instrumenting the dummy variable of interest rate swap use is not necessary.
33 Using fitted values from a first-stage probit model as instruments — as described in Wooldridge
(2010) — does not change the results qualitatively. This also holds for the fixed effects time-series
models. However, this approach would not allow a test for overidentification.
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4.5.1.2 Time-Series Variation
In this Section, we investigate the time-series behavior of the modified duration gap and
present the results in Table 4.7. The use of panel data allows us to include macroeco-
nomic variables which we can use to prove market timing behavior in on-balance-sheet
IRR exposure. Our standard model (Panel A) includes time dummies to control for the
potential impact of several macroeconomic indicators. Compared to the cross-sectional
model, the time-series model has significantly lower explanatory power based on the coef-
ficient of determination R2. The variables included are therefore better able to distinguish
cross-sectional differences between banks than to explain the adjustment of the duration
gap over time.
In the baseline model, we find the coefficients for the Interest rate swap use to be not
significant except for the sub-group of banks that changed their status of swap use at
least once, which we refer to as “starters”. Most of these banks started hedging during
the sample period and therefore changed from non-users to users at least once. For this
sub-sample we find a coefficient of 0.15 percentage points, significant at the 1% level and
comparable in magnitude to the cross-sectional models. As the majority of banks, around
two-thirds, not change their swap use status once during the sample period, and either
never uses swaps or does so in all years, too little intertemporal variation exists for the
fixed effects estimator to deliver significant results in the other three samples.
For the other explanatory variables, we find the same coefficient sign in the time-series
models as in the cross-sectional models. The only exemption is Size, which now has
significantly negative coefficients. Hence, as banks become larger, they decrease their
98
on-balance-sheet exposure resulting from term transformation. One explanation is that
bigger banks start engaging in other business lines that generate fee and trading in-
come. The significance of loan commitments decreases in the trading book sample, but
is still significant at the 10% level. The effect of competition shows ambiguous results.
Whereas decreasing competition leads non-trading book institutions to take on less risk,
the opposite holds for trading book banks. However, mixed empirical findings for the
relation between competition and risk taking have already been documented by Boyd and
De Nicoló (2005).
The macroeconomic variables confirm results from previous analysis. Banks increase their
duration gap when the yield curve becomes steeper and maturity transformation becomes
more profitable. Similar results were found by Purnanandam (2007) and Memmel and
Schertler (2011). As the level of the short-term 1-year government yield is highly collinear
to the slope of the yield curve, we do not include it as an extra variable but create an
interaction term with the slope instead. These interaction terms are significantly negative
and confirm theories related to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and
Zhu, 2012). Jiménez et al. (2012) find that short-term rates matter for banks’ risk taking,
whereas the long-term 10-year rate has no significant impact. During times of high short-
term rates, when short-term lending funded with deposits that pay less than market rates
is also profitable, banks engage in less maturity transformation (Panel B). Interestingly,
banks decrease their duration gap in times of uncertainty in interbank markets, measured
by a higher spread of the 1-year LIBOR over the 1-year government rate (Panel C and D).
However, when interbank uncertainty arises contemporaneously with a steep yield curve,
99
banks decrease their maturity mismatch less drastically, as there are still profits to earn
from maturity transformation (Panel D).
4.5.2 Interest Rate Swap Use Decision
In this section we analyze the determinants for the use of interest rate swaps by applying
pooled probit models into which we include macroeconomic variables. The results are
presented in Table 4.8. Again, the baseline model in Panel A includes time dummies,
whereas the other model specifications use the same sets of macroeconomic variables as
in the time-series setting of the duration gap analysis.
Maturity gap has the expected positive coefficients, always significant at the 1% level.
Pure banking book institutions show a three to four times higher sensitivity to on-balance-
sheet IRR than banking book institutions. Once the smaller non-trading book banks
decide to use interest rate swaps, they can hedge the IRR from maturity transformation
and can accept short-term deposits and make long-term loans, as long as they keep their
overall exposure below the “outlier” thresholds of the IRR regulation schemes.
The sign of the coefficient of the PD provides evidence on the predictions of static hedging
models (Froot et al., 1993; Froot and Stein, 1998). The higher the default risk and the
associated cost of bankruptcy, the higher the propensity to use interest rate swaps. Again,
the sensitivity of trading book financial intermediaries, which are more likely to depend
on their credit rating in interbank and capital markets, is higher in magnitude. However,
these banks might use interest rate swaps, at least partly, for speculation purposes too.
Also for banks, we find the empirically well-documented effect that larger entities are more
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likely to use OBS derivatives. This is most likely due to economies of scale in establishing
risk management departments that are proficient enough to use interest rate swaps.
So far, all our results are consistent with those of Purnanandam (2007). The major differ-
ence is the coefficients related to bank liquidity measures, for which Purnanandam finds
significantly negative relationships. We find that savings deposits have no impact on the
interest rate swap use decision. The buffer stock of liquid assets is found to be insignificant
for trading book institutions, but significantly negative for pure banking book interme-
diaries. This indicates that these banks consider liquid assets to be a complementary
hedging tool, whereas risk management theory stresses the substitutionary relation (e.g.,
Bolton et al., 2013). One potential explanation for this finding lies in the role that liq-
uidity buffers have in the theory of intertemporal smoothing of non-diversifiable liquidity
and interest rate risk (Allen and Gale, 1997).
Competition is not found to have an effect on banks’ likelihood to use swaps, although
theory would have suggested so (Adam et al., 2007). Zhu (2011) finds significant effects
from hedging on competition and vice versa. However, she investigates unregulated in-
dustries’ commodity price hedging. In the regulated banking industry, competition has
no effect on the decision to use swaps after controlling for all the other determinants that
affect interest rate risk taking.
Past swap experience has the expected positive sign and coefficients are far above 1
and have a significance level of 1% in all samples and regression setups. Average board
experience, on the other hand, reduces the likelihood of the use of interest rate swaps and
is always conveniently significant at 5%. The negative effects are most pronounced for
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trading book institutions. These results contradict those found in the literature hitherto.
Zhu (2012) finds that younger and therefore less experienced CEOs are less likely to use
OBS hedging.
The macroeconomic variables serve as indicators of market timing in hedging decisions.
Pure banking book institutions are less likely to use swaps when the yield curve is steep
(Panel B). These findings are consistent with Memmel and Schertler (2011). As non-
trading book banks can use interest rate swaps only for hedging purposes, they hedge
less of their floating-rate debt exposure in times when corporates also hedge less (Faulk-
ender, 2005; Vickery, 2008). For trading book banks, we find insignificant or significantly
positive relationships. Here, it has to be taken into account that these banks can use in-
terest rate swaps for speculation on the yield curve and positive coefficients can indicate
increasing off-balance-sheet IRR exposure. The interaction term with the 1-year yield is
significantly negative for all samples (Panel B).34 Interbank funding uncertainty increases
banks’ likelihood of using interest rate swaps (Panel C and D). Interestingly, both the
overall and aggregate sectoral quotas of banks that use interest rate swaps are highly
correlated with the LIBOR spread. Sectoral quotas have been calculated by separating
savings, cooperative and private commercial banks. Hence, funding uncertainty seems to
be a major driver of the swap use decision on an industry level. This is further evidence
for the dynamic risk management theories that incorporate liquidity issues into hedging
decisions. Furthermore, our finding is supported by the increasing use of overnight index
34 It should be noted that the elasticities of interacted variables in probit models should be interpreted
with caution as the correction proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) has not been applied. However,
we derive similar coefficients in magnitude for the interacted and all other variables from linear
probability models (LPM).
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swaps in the banking industry. Banks seem especially interested in hedging against a po-
tential increase in short-term wholesale funding exposure and not so much the IRR that
results from transforming savings deposits into long-term loans. Again, when uncertainty
is accompanied by a steep yield curve making term transformation profitable, the effect
of the LIBOR spread becomes smaller (Panel D).
Customer loans and loan commitments are relevant instruments that conveniently pass
the weak instrument tests and always have Cragg-Donald F -statistics above the threshold
of 19.93. Their validity is supported using overidentification tests that are insignificant for
all samples being estimated. The exogeneity tests of Smith and Blundell (1986) indicate
that, for pure banking book institutions, the maturity gap is an endogenous driver of their
decision to hold swaps, but exogeneity cannot be rejected for trading book banks as well
as starters.
4.5.3 Extent of Interest Rate Swap Use
4.5.3.1 Cross-Sectional Variation
Table 4.9 shows the cross-sectional results of the extent of interest rate swaps used for
between effects and a pooled specification. For trading book banks, only three variables
are found to be significant. The significant determinants are the PD, which increases the
extent of interest rate swap use, Size, which also has a significantly positive impact, and
the Past swap experience. Although only three variables are significant, the R-squares are
higher for trading book bank samples than for pure banking book institution samples. As
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the cross-sectional estimators should explain constant extent of swap use, whereas we can-
not distinguish whether interest rate swaps are used for speculation or hedging purposes,
the assumptions underlying the estimators may be violated. The results should therefore
be interpreted with caution. In particular, concluding that the positive coefficient found
for the Probability of default indicates a reduction of IRR through interest rate swaps is
not straightforward. The opposite could be true, namely that trading book banks with a
higher likelihood of default increase their risk by speculating on interest rate movements,
as predicted by dynamic risk management models for financially constrained firms (e.g.,
Bolton et al., 2013).
For the sample of pure banking book institutions, we find results in line with those Pur-
nanandam (2007) obtained when he investigated interest derivatives for hedging purposes.
Banks with higher duration gaps hold significantly more interest rate swaps, and banks
with a higher cost of distress also increase their swap use to hedge IRR, consistent with
the implications for the risk management behavior of unconstrained firms in corporate fi-
nance theory. As for trading book banks, Size also shows significantly positive coefficients
and asset growth is found to be insignificant.
Liquidity endowments, in general, reduce the volume of swaps held. This is consistent with
the predictions of modern dynamic risk management theory, where cash is considered a
substitute for hedging activities (e.g., Bolton et al., 2013). Savings deposits as an indicator
of stable funding sources significantly reduce the extent of interest rate swaps. The same
holds for the buffer of liquid assets, however only when a between estimator is used.
Competition has no influence on the extent of interest rate swaps.
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Controlling for sample selection bias is only necessary for the pure banking book sample
as well as the total sample, but not for the trading book sample. The reduction of sample
size conditional on using swaps is most substantial for non-trading book institutions, while
the observations in the trading book sample drop only slightly. Observations decrease by
more than two-thirds in the pure banking book sample from 17,166 to 5,725, whereas the
reduction is only around 20% for the banking book institutions, from 2,170 to 1,701.
Again, the instruments pass the weak instrument tests and are clearly above the threshold
of 19.93 calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005). Instrument validity is confirmed by the
Hansen-J test of overidentification. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity tests indicate
that the modified duration gap is indeed an endogenous determinant of the nominal
volume of banks’ interest rate swaps. This result holds for all sub-samples of the pooled
OLS models.
4.5.3.2 Time-Series Variation
In a time-series setting — results are presented in Table 4.10 — the duration gap has a
positive and even larger impact on the extent of interest rate swaps used than in the cross-
sectional settings. To address problems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity as
well as sample selection, we estimate these models following Semykina and Wooldridge
(2010). The impact is largest for commercial banks that start using interest rate swaps
during the sample period. In contrast to the cross-sectional regressions, we do not find
a significant influence of the probability of default in any of the regressions run on the
swap extent. The same is true of liquid asset endowments and mostly also of savings
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deposits. These results are in contrast to our cross-sectional findings and also to the
time-series models of Purnanandam (2007), who finds a significantly negative impact for
both variables.
Size has a significantly positive impact on the extent of interest rate swap use and is
larger than in the cross-sectional regressions. Total asset growth is largely found to be
insignificant, except for trading book institutions, where significantly negative coefficients
can be observed. However, again this finding is hard to interpret as we do not know
whether swaps are held for speculative or for hedging purposes.
The exogeneity tests cannot reject the endogeneity of the duration gap, as in the cross-
sectional regressions. The critical threshold of 19.93, as stated by Stock and Yogo (2005),
for the Cragg-Donald F -tests is not passed in all regression models. However, even the
smallest values observed for the F -tests are close to 15 and we therefore consider our
instruments to be relevant. Hansen-J tests again support the exclusion restrictions and
are conveniently insignificant at least at a 25% level.
4.5.4 Summary of Results from the Simultaneous Equations
4.5.4.1 Simultaneous Risk Management
For banks in the non-trading book sample we find that more restrictive on-balance-sheet
IRR management, resulting in lower maturity gaps, and an intensified use of interest
rate swaps are substitute strategies. The coefficients derived for the probability of default
largely provide an empirical support for the behavior of unconstrained firms in theoretical
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Table 4.11: Summary Hausman Tests
Dependent variable Modified duration gap Dummy interest rate swap use Extent of interest rate swap use
Sample Total Starters Total Trading Starters Total Starters
Explanatory Variable
Maturity gap endog. exog. endog. endog. endog.
Dummy interest rate swap
use
exog. endog.
This table summarizes the results of the Hausman-type tests of the exogenous variables in the simultaneous equations framework.
corporate finance risk management models. However, the proxy for profitable growth
opportunities — the growth rate of total assets — is most often insignificant. In robustness
checks this also holds for the growth rate of customer loans, and total loans, and if
we choose real instead of nominal growth rates by deflating monetary volumes. The
market timing behavior we find for the slope of the yield curve is in line with the results
Memmel (2011) receives for the overall, combined on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet
IRR exposures.
4.5.4.2 Exogeneity Tests
Table 4.11 summarizes the results from the exogeneity tests of the potentially endogenous
explanatory variables within the simultaneous regression framework. As the results for
cross-sectional and time-series regressions do not differ, no differentiation is made. We
also display only the results for the total sample and the sample of banks starting to use
interest rate swaps for the first time. The only exemption is that the result for trading
book institutions in the interest rate swap use probit regressions as it differs from the
results for exogeneity tests for the total and non-trading book sample.
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The decision to use interest rate swaps is only endogenous to the maturity gap for the
sub-sample of banks that start hedging during the sample period. These results are robust
if we replace the dummy of current swap use by the volume of swaps scaled by total assets.
For all other banks, including the total sample which is dominated by banks that either
use interest rate swaps in all years or in not a single year, the decision is exogenous. The
duration gap is an endogenous determinant of the decision to use interest rate swaps even
for starters. It is only for trading book institutions that exogeneity cannot be rejected.
With regard to the extent of interest rate swaps held conditional on a positive decision to
use interest rate swaps at all, the maturity gap is always endogenous.
We interpret the results as follows. The decision to use interest rate swaps and the extent
of their use seem mainly driven by the contemporaneous IRR regulation in Germany,
whereas the maturity gap seems to be largely determined by borrower and lender liquidity
preferences. Banks that face the decision to newly start employing interest rate swaps are
likely to have a maturity gap close to the threshold of being considered an “outlier” bank
by the regulator. “Outliers” lose more than 20% of their regulatory equity in a simulated
130 basis point parallel upward shift of the yield curve.35 Starters face the decision of
paying the one-time initial cost of establishing a derivatives hedging department, becoming
an “outlier” bank that exceeds the regulatory threshold36 or, alternatively, rejecting the
35 The IRR regulation was revised in the fourth quarter of 2011. The relevant interest rate shock has
been increased to 200 basis points and banks are no longer referred to as “outliers” but as institutions
with “elevated interest rate risk”. For more details of the IRR regulation, see Deutsche Bundesbank
(2012). Excluding observations from the end of 2011, when the new regulatory framework became
effective, does not change our results.
36 The effects of being classified as an “outlier” by the regulator on the overall IRR exposure have been
documented by Memmel (2011). Banks decrease overall IRR exposure drastically afterwards.
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loan maturity borrowers demand. In contrast, banks whose exposure is far away from the
threshold or those whose exposure is above the threshold but which have already initiated
an OBS risk management desk in order to comply with the IRR regulation can offer any
loan maturity borrowers demand and accept all volumes of short-term deposits. Hence,
only for starters the decision to use interest rate swaps is endogenous to the maturity gap.
The IRR regulation in Germany can also explain the more pronounced use of interest
rate derivatives in Germany compared to the U.S., although the intertemporal smoothing
theory of Allen and Gale (1997) predicts a higher propensity of derivative use for the U.S.,
German commercial banks seem to use interest rate swaps predominantly for compliance
with the IRR regulation and not to manage liquidity risk.37
We additionally interpret the finding that the interest swap use dummy is exogenous for
most samples to the fact that German commercial banks’ maturity mismatch is largely
determined by customers’ liquidity needs. Research on borrowers’ preferences reveals that
loan size is most sensitive to the maturity being offered, whereas interest rate sensitivity
is less pronounced. These findings are interpreted as the existence of binding borrower
liquidity constraints (e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 2008; Attanasio et al., 2008). Germany’s
legal and institutional environment provide banks with incentives to supply borrowers
with long-term liquidity if demanded. In the German bank-dominated financial system
only few large corporates have access to equity and debt capital markets, whereas the
majority of Germany’s small and medium-sized enterprises, known as the “Mittelstand”,
37 We are not aware of a similar “outlier” threshold with regard to a potential equity loss in the
Economic Value Model applied by the Federal Reserve to investigate U.S. commercial banks’ IRR,
although also a 200 basis point shift in the yield curve is also simulated. The threshold seems more
likely to be one comparing banks relative IRR (Houpt and Embersit, 1991) than an absolute one.
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depend completely on banks with which they most often have longstanding relationships.
Additionally households have most of their savings as deposits with banks (e.g., Allen and
Santomero, 2001).
Major determinants of the loan maturity being granted by a bank are the degrees of
information asymmetry and moral hazard that are inherent to the borrower relationship.
Ways to mitigate the maturity-reducing impact of the aforementioned factors are pledging
collateral and relationship lending. The German “Hausbank” principle is one of the
strongest forms of relationship lending. Additionally, most often commercial property or
real estate is pledged as collateral and valued quite conservatively. Therefore, German
banks are likely to offer the same long-term loans as banks in the U.K., although Germany
offers less favorable creditor rights (Davydenko and Franks, 2008; Qian and Strahan,
2007). The property rights prevailing in Germany are among the most friendly what
additionally facilitates granting long-term loans (Bae and Goyal, 2009). To sum up, the
German legal and institutional environment helps to reduce moral hazard, and therefore
banks seem to be able and willing to offer their lenders the maturities they demand.
Given this setting, it appears plausible that the decision to use swaps is exogenous to
the maturity gap except for those banks that face the decision to set up a derivatives
department for the first time. Banks at the “outlier” threshold which decide to manage
IRR solely on the balance sheet are likely to use their interbank lending and borrowing
to adjust their maturity gap endogenously (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004).
Our findings thus confirm that banks use interest rate swaps predominantly for hedging
purposes in compliance with IRR regulation. Pure banking book institutions seem at first
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to choose the magnitude of their maturity gap based on liquidity demand. Afterwards,
they decide on the extent of swaps that is necessary in order not to exceed the “outlier”
threshold. With regard to the set-up of our simultaneous equation framework, we sum-
marize that the decision to use swaps and the maturity gap do not necessarily have to be
estimated simultaneously, except for banks that start using derivatives for the first time.
4.6 Conclusion
Modeling German commercial banks’ IRR management as the simultaneous choice of on-
balance-sheet maturity gap management and OBS interest rate swap use, we find that
both decisions serve as substitutes for one another. The effect of bankruptcy risk on
risk management decisions is consistent with the predictions of corporate finance models
for financially unconstrained firms. Being faced with a higher default likelihood makes
banks pursue more conservative on-balance-sheet portfolio management with less maturity
mismatch, and increases their propensity to hedge on-balance-sheet risk with interest rate
swaps.
Our empirical findings are largely in line with those of Purnanandam (2007) who inves-
tigates IRR management for U.S. commercial banks. One major exemption is the effect
that liquid assets have on the use of interest rate derivatives. U.S. banks manage buffer
stocks of liquid assets as substitutes to OBS hedging in line with the theoretical impact
predicted by dynamic risk management theories. German commercial banks, on the other
hand, consider liquidity buffers complementary risk management strategies to the decision
to hold interest rate swaps. Once banks decide to employ interest rate swaps, the extent
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of their use serves as a substitute for liquid assets. The differences in managing liquidity
and interest rate risk on the balance sheet or off the balance sheet have been stressed
by Allen and Santomero (2001) based on the theoretical model of Allen and Gale (1997).
U.S. banks are more likely to manage risks using derivative hedging, whereas German
banks can rely more heavily on on-balance-sheet risk management due to intertemporal
smoothing.
The reason why we nevertheless observe more commercial banks in Germany using OBS
risk management instruments than in the U.S. is the outcome of the IRR regulation in
Germany. Exogeneity tests on the endogenous regressors in the simultaneous equations
suggest that swap use is exogenous to the magnitude of the duration gap. Hence, banks
seem first to decide on their duration gap, which is driven by the liquidity preferences
of their customers. Afterwards, they make their decisions on using interest rate swaps.
This holds for all banks, except for banks that start using interest rate swaps for the first
time. Only these banks simultaneously decide on their maturity mismatch and the use of
interest rate swaps.
We find market timing behavior in IRR management in samples of banks that are by
law prohibited from engaging in substantial OBS speculation. Our results show that
banks are willing to take more IRR when a steep yield curve makes maturity transfor-
mation profitable. Funding uncertainty in the interbank markets urges banks to reduce
on-balance-sheet risk by means of derivatives hedging. High levels of short-term nominal
interest rates induce banks to further reduce IRR exposure. This finding is consistent
with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Including macroeconomic variables does
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not change the relationship between on-balance exposure and interest swap use decisions,
and therefore the speculative element in market timing appears minor compared to the
dominant effect that on-balance and off-balance IRR management serve as substitutes.
Our research has strong implications for banking supervisory authorities as the design
of IRR regulation has a major impact on banks’ decision to hedge on-balance-sheet risk
with OBS derivatives. As OBS derivatives only allow for trading the interest rate but not
(fully) the liquidity risk, there is room for future research to investigate how a combined
interest rate and liquidity risk regulation, as proposed by Basel III, with the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio, will affect banks’ portfolio structures.
For banks in market-based and bank-based financial systems which both adopt Basel III,
it will be interesting to observe whether the theoretical predictions from Allen and Gale’s
model on the relation between liquid assets and OBS risk management still hold after
liquidity risk becomes more heavily regulated.
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Appendix D
Variable Description
Table D.1 gives an overview of the variables used in the hazard rate model and the interest
rate risk management analysis and how these variables were calculated.
Table D.1: Variable Description
Hazard rate model
Tier 1 capital ratio Tier 1 capital to total assets
Total bank reserves Total reserves that qualify as equity to total assets
Dummy reserve reduction Dummy taking the value 1 if Total bank reserves have been reduced
Sector HHI Herfindahl index of credit portfolio concentration over 14 industry sectors
Dummy hidden liabilities Dummy taking the value 1 if the bank avoided writing off assets
ROE Return on equity calculated as operating income to equity
Branch HHI Herfindahl index of bank branches per county averaged over all counties
where the bank runs branches
Dummy savings banks Dummy taking the value 1 if bank is a savings bank
Dummy cooperative banks Dummy taking the value 1 if bank is a cooperative bank
LIBOR 12 month LIBOR
Regional GDP growth Real GDP growth at the state level
IRR management model
Dependent variables:
Modified duration gap Calculated according to Appendix E
Dummy interest rate swap use Dummy taking the value 1 if the bank used either interest rate or currency
swaps once since 1998
Extent of interest rate swap use ln of the nominal volume of interest rate swaps
Explanatory variables:
Probability of default (ln) ln of the probability of default derived from the hazard rate model
Size ln of total assets
Savings deposits Savings deposits to total assets
Liquid assets Liquid assets to total assets
Total asset growth Growth rate of total assets
Dummy trading book Dummy that takes the value 1 if a bank is qualified according to the German
Banking Act
Inverse Mills ratio Inverse Mills ratio is calculated according to Wooldridge (2010) in cross-
sectional and according to Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) in time-series
models
Customer loans Customer loans to total assets
Loan commitments Loan commitments to total assets
Past swap experience Dummy that takes the value of 1 when a bank used either interest or cur-
rency swaps once in previous years since 1998. This variable is adjusted for
mergers and assigns a 1 if one of two merging banks had swap experience.
Avg. board experience This variable is the average experience measured in years of all board mem-
bers. Experience encompasses all positions in banking where candidates
need to be approved by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Author-
ity BaFin.
Yield curve slope The spread between the 10 year and the 1 year yield of German government
bonds
1-year interest rate The 1-year yield on German government bonds
LIBOR spread The spread between the 12-month LIBOR and the 12-month German gov-
ernment yield
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Appendix E
Modified Duration Gap
Time-to-maturity is defined either as the remaining time-to-maturity or as the time re-
maining until the next repricing. The modified duration gap is calculated by first assign-
ing the modified durations of the standard BaFin approach to the maturity brackets, and
then summing up the volume-weighted assets’ and liabilities’ time-to-maturity brackets.
The modified duration gap can then be calculated from the modified asset and liability
duration by
Dgap = DAmod −DLmod
total interest-earning liabilities
total interest-paying assets ,
where total interest-bearing assets (liabilities) is the sum of business volume reported
in the time-to-maturity brackets. Information on assets’ remaining time to maturity is
available for loans to banks and non-banks. For liabilities’ remaining time to maturity
in addition to loans from banks and non-banks, savings accounts and bonds issued are
also available. For each of these categories, four maturity brackets have been collected
ranging from three months or less, more than three months up to one year, more than
a year up to five years, and finally, more than five years. The interest rate sensitivities
assigned to these brackets are 0.16%, 0.71%, 3.07%, and 5.08%, respectively. In order to
eliminate unrealistic outliers, we drop all banks that report negative volumes in any of the
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time-to-maturity brackets. Additionally, we require that three out of the four brackets
reported for loans to and from non-banks have non-zero volume.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Summary
This thesis consists of a literature review on banks’ IRR, and two essays dealing with how
banks should price the IRR from maturity transformation into their loan and deposit rates,
and how OBS hedging via interest rate swaps affects banks’ on-balance-sheet duration gap.
In an extension of the Ho-Saunders models, we show in Chapter 3 how managing the
maturity gap affects banks’ loan and deposit pricing. Our model predicts that financial
intermediaries demand risk premia for the maturity mismatch they bear on the asset side,
but reduce their charges if maturity transformation is expected to earn excess returns.
For deposits, the opposite holds. As deposits possess longer maturities than funding from
the money markets, banks should optimally give depositors risk discounts, but should
also price the expected income from maturity transformation forgone.
Empirically, we test our model for the German commercial banking sector. We find the
model-derived pricing behavior in banks’ interest income, as a proxy of the average loan
rate. However, the effects found for for banks’ interest expenses, as a proxy for deposit
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pricing, are only weakly pronounced and most often insignificant. As a third measure of
interest pricing, we investigate the net interest income margin, and find the theoretically
predicted effects as for the interest margin. Thus, by disentangling net interest income
into income and expenses, we show that risk and return from maturity transformation
are largely priced through the asset side into banks’ overall profitability.
As liabilities usually do not fully offset the IRR from loans, interest rate swaps can be
an additional way to hedge it off the balance sheet. In Chapter 4, we analyze German
commercial banks’ IRR management as the simultaneous decisions of the magnitude of
the duration gap and the use of interest rate swaps. Our empirical findings show that
banks predominately use interest rate swaps for hedging purposes as a substitute strategy
for managing IRR on the balance sheet. However, although hedging motives dominate, we
do find mild speculation in the form of selective hedging in response to the macroeconomic
environment. Banks decrease their hedging attempts with a steep slope of the yield curve,
but intensify them when interbank funding spreads, as an indicator of wholesale funding
uncertainty, rise.
Hausman-type exogeneity tests of the dependent variables in the simultaneous equations
framework show that the decision of the duration gap and the use of interest rate swaps
are not necessarily endogenous to one another. Only banks that start using interest rate
swaps for the first time face a situation where both decisions are, indeed, endogenous. For
banks that also engage in trading activities, both decisions appear to be exogenous to one
another. As these banks might use interest rate swaps at least partly also for speculative
purposes, the result seems plausible. For all other commercial banks, the duration gap
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is an endogenous determinant of the decision to use interest rate swaps, but the use of
swaps is exogenous to the duration gap.
We interpret the results from exogeneity tests as follows. The decision to use interest
rate swaps is largely driven by the IRR regulation proposed by the Basel Committee with
its given “outlier” threshold. Therefore, only banks that never used interest rate swaps
before but exceeded the threshold face a situation of reciprocal endogeneity. For the other
commercial banks that do not engage in substantial trading, the decision to use swaps
is exogenous when deciding on the magnitude of the duration gap. Banks’ maturity gap
seems for these banks to be driven by borrowers’ liquidity needs.
Given these results, it might be interesting in future research to examine the impact of
the newly proposed liquidity regulation within Basel III, namely the Net Stable Funding
Ratio and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, on banks pricing as well as OBS hedging de-
cisions in view of liquidity risk’s close relation to IRR. The associations of the savings
and cooperative banks argue that the new liquidity regulation will force them to lower
their maturity gaps and will diminish their future profitability. Some bank managers even
argue that their whole business models are threatened. Thus, IRR will remain a timely
topic in financial intermediation research in the future.
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